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Executive Summary 
In order to realize the full potential of the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen), improved management along planned trajectories between air navigation service 
providers (ANSPs) and system users (e.g., pilots and airline dispatchers) is needed. Future 
automation improvements and increased data communications between aircraft and ground 
automation would make the concept of Management by Trajectory (MBT) possible. Key 
components of an MBT concept include:  
 The ability for air traffic controllers and managers to quickly generate, evaluate and 
implement changes to an aircraft’s trajectory. 
 Imposing constraints on flight operator-preferred trajectories only to the extent necessary 
to maintain safe and efficient traffic flows. 
 A method for the exchange of trajectory information between ground automation 
systems and the aircraft that allows for trajectory synchronization and trajectory 
negotiation. 
MBT addresses shortfalls that remain in the Trajectory Based Operations (TBO) solution set, 
despite years of research into various aspects of transitioning from the current airspace 
environment to TBO. This report is the result of a survey of this research, as well as enabling 
technologies. The report provides insights into previous related concepts and technologies, with 
a particular focus on lessons that can be applied to the MBT concept development and 
evaluation effort in order to improve the feasibility and ultimate adoption of MBT. Specifically, for 
each topic covered in the study, the report identifies roadblocks to adoption and/or enablers that 
should be considered in MBT concept development. 
The objectives of this study are to describe previous attempts at developing and/or 
implementing MBT concepts and concept elements. The description of these efforts identify: 
 Likely reasons why previous MBT concept elements have not been fully adopted. 
 Portions of previous concepts that have been adopted and the likely enablers of these 
adoptions. 
 Whether there is growing consensus, or lack thereof, about aspects of MBT concept 
elements. 
Key findings determined from this study include the following:  
1. During the original Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) program, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had identified airborne reroutes as a benefit 
mechanism, but did not have the modeling tools to assess the benefit. Had the FAA 
included the reroutes benefit mechanism, users may have seen a tangible benefit 
that would support a decision to invest in CPDLC equipment. Voice communication 
of complex reroutes is impractical for widespread use in the National Airspace 
System (NAS). The nine-year deferment of data link capabilities has slowed progress 
toward TBO in general, and MBT in particular. Future MBT cost/benefits assessment 
should: a) identify benefit mechanisms that are tangible to users; b) identify methods 
for determining hard-to-assess benefit mechanisms; and c) consider providing 
financial incentives for flight operators to equip with capabilities that are foundational 
to the MBT concept. 
2. The Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract (ADS-C) Extended Projected 
Profile (EPP) report appears to be the only capability on the horizon with any 
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momentum that can be utilized for sharing complete (or near-complete) flight 
management system (FMS) trajectory intent with ANSP ground systems. However, 
there is no mandate to equip aircraft to provide the EPP report, which is expected to 
be very expensive. The MBT concept should include a concept variant that assumes 
the EPP report will not be available to provide intent for a high percentage of aircraft. 
However, for aircraft that cannot downlink the EPP report, managing aircraft 
trajectory prediction uncertainty will be more difficult, lessening the effectiveness of 
MBT. However, as noted below, there is a fast-growing industry and suite of 
technologies that may mitigate this impediment to full MBT implementation. 
3. The wide range of FMS capabilities in the NAS that currently exists and will continue 
to exist for decades into the future results in a mixed capability environment. The 
MBT concept will have to consider the best approach for addressing the mixed 
capability environment on a concept element by concept element basis. It may be 
necessary to determine what “best equipped, best served” means for each MBT 
concept element. 
4. High cost inhibits low-cost carriers from implementing in-flight connectivity (IFC) to 
the internet. Low-cost carriers may not be able to leverage electronic flight bag (EFB) 
applications and System Wide Information Management (SWIM) information. Thus, 
certain benefits of MBT (e.g., effective trajectory negotiation) that rely on dynamic 
information may not be attainable to them. 
5. There are many letters of agreement (LOAs) and standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) that can change the aircraft trajectory but are unknown to the pilot and are 
not available in an FMS database. Furthermore, trajectory changes (e.g., altitude and 
speed restrictions) due to these procedures often put the aircraft on an open 
trajectory. LOAs and SOPs place constraints on aircraft trajectories that today are 
not published, and FMSs have limited database capacity to add the data associated 
with these SOPs and LOAs. MBT should account for these constraints and their 
effect on trajectories and trajectory negotiation. 
6. Trajectory uncertainty causes controllers to use tactical clearances, which tend to be 
open trajectory clearances. Without the automation support for closed trajectories, 
controllers will continue to use open trajectory techniques. Open trajectory 
clearances exacerbate the trajectory uncertainty in the system. On the other hand, 
trajectory predictability enables controllers to use strategic, closed trajectory 
clearances, which then maintains a high level of trajectory predictability. Thus, the 
MBT concept needs to consider the set of technologies, procedures, and cultural 
changes that will be the tipping point that moves the NAS towards widespread use of 
closed trajectories and predictability to facilitate MBT. 
7. The lack of interest among the air carrier industry in applications to leverage 
Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP), which provide similar types of 
benefits as trajectory negotiation, is a cautionary tale for trajectory negotiation 
participation. Trajectory negotiation is one of the MBT benefits that provides users 
direct, tangible benefits across the fleet or for individual flights. If users choose not to 
upgrade their capabilities to facilitate trajectory negotiation, it is an indicator that they 
may not upgrade for other aspects of MBT. It will be difficult to make realistic 
estimates of user participation for trajectory negotiation, which will have a direct 
bearing on benefits. 
8. The lack of a single concept of operations for TBO has led to many different opinions 
about what TBO should be with little convergence by the air traffic management 
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(ATM) research community. The FAA needs to clearly define the TBO concept and 
the NAS Enterprise Architecture evolution associated with the transition to TBO. This 
provides an opportunity for NASA to provide leadership to help the FAA define the 
TBO concept elements, of which MBT is one. 
9. Weather will continue to be a major contributor to residual trajectory uncertainty as 
well as traffic flow management (TFM) uncertainty. Yet it is well known in the ATM 
community that many decision support tools (DSTs) do not perform well in dynamic 
situations such as weather. This is not a coincidence – rather it is because they have 
not been designed to handle dynamic situations. Weather problems are often 
“assumed away” in the concept description or just completely ignored. The 
underlying justification, whether stated or not, is that most days in the NAS do not 
have major weather disruptions. Furthermore, the complexity of addressing dynamic 
weather situations during concept evaluations limits their assessment. Thus, while 
lateral and temporal trajectory constraints are seen as the interface between TFM 
and MBT, the validity of these constraints in addressing demand/capacity 
imbalances in the presence of weather will likely be degraded. 
10. Controller complexity and traffic density in the eastern US will continue to prevent the 
use of user preferred routes (UPRs) in that region, yet no research has been 
performed to identify the traffic level threshold where UPR requests should be 
accepted or rejected. 
Lastly, there is growing consensus that the introduction of SWIM, airborne access to SWIM 
(AAtS), IFC, and EFBs has significant potential to disrupt business as usual in the ATM 
environment, particularly for MBT concepts such as trajectory negotiation, which provides a 
tangible benefit to the user. And the FAA is making important strides to enable more effective 
airborne reroutes. These are all predicated on Data Comm equipage. There is also the 
realization that a mixed equipage environment will exist on many fronts for the foreseeable 
future for Data Comm, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In, and ADS-C 
EPP. Each concept element will have to be evaluated to determine how best-equipped, best-
served should be applied with an emphasis on identifying tangible benefit mechanisms. 
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1. Introduction 
In the current operational environment, air traffic control (ATC) automation, such as arrival 
and departure schedulers in the Time Based Flow Management (TBFM) system, develops plans 
based on aircraft trajectory predictions using available information such as aircraft performance 
and winds/weather. However, once that plan is in place, controllers tactically manage the 
aircraft, using vectors, altitude, or speed clearances, to either conform to the schedule at control 
points or to address other issues that come up, such as maintaining separation, or changing 
weather conditions. Since these tactical actions are not directly communicated to the 
automation systems, the underlying trajectories may not be properly updated, which can lead to 
inefficiencies in the air traffic system. Although aircraft are equipped with many capabilities to 
predict and fly a trajectory, the controller’s tactical instructions often prevent full use of these 
capabilities. 
In order to realize the full potential of the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen), there needs to be better coordination between air navigation service providers 
(ANSPs) and system users (e.g., pilots and airline dispatchers) in terms of better managing 
aircraft along planned trajectories. Future automation improvements and increased data 
communications between aircraft and ground automation would make this idea of Management 
by Trajectory (MBT) possible. Key components of an MBT concept include:  
 The ability for air traffic controllers and managers to quickly generate, evaluate and 
implement changes to an aircraft’s trajectory. 
 Imposing constraints on flight operator-preferred trajectories only to the extent necessary 
to maintain safe and efficient traffic flows. 
 A method for the exchange of trajectory information between ground automation 
systems and the aircraft that allows for trajectory synchronization and trajectory 
negotiation. 
MBT addresses shortfalls that remain in the Trajectory Based Operations (TBO) solution set, 
despite years of research into various aspects of transitioning from the current airspace 
environment to TBO. This report is the result of a survey of this research, as well as enabling 
technologies. The report provides insights into previous related concepts and technologies, with 
a particular focus on lessons that can be applied to the MBT concept development and 
evaluation effort in order to improve the feasibility and ultimate adoption of MBT. Specifically, for 
each topic covered in the study, the report identifies roadblocks to adoption and/or enablers that 
should be considered in MBT concept development. 
1.1 Objectives 
The objectives of the trajectory management study are to describe previous attempts at 
developing and/or implementing MBT concepts and concept elements. The scope of the study 
includes available research and development efforts in government, industry, and universities 
as well as operational implementation examples in the US or elsewhere. The description of 
these efforts should identify: 
 Likely reasons why previous MBT concept elements have not been fully adopted, 
including any faulty assumptions and technical, political, cultural, and other limitations. 
 Portions of previous concepts that have been adopted and the likely enablers of these 
adoptions. 
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 Whether there is growing consensus, or lack thereof, about aspects of MBT concept 
elements. 
1.2 Document organization 
This document is organized as follows:  
Section 2 describes the approach for scoping prior work for review to support the study 
objectives. 
Section 3 discusses enabling technologies and automation systems that are considered 
important for realizing the potential of MBT. 
Section 4 discusses previous research into topics considered to be elements of the MBT 
concept. 
Section 5 discusses safety considerations for the MBT concept. 
Section 6 summarizes the key findings. 
1.2.1 A note on reference sources 
In an effort to present timely information about recent developments, some of the references 
used in this document are web pages with uniform resource locaters (URLs) that may or may 
not be available in the future. If the reference source is a URL to a webpage, a footnote is 
utilized with the URL identified to provide the reader with convenient access to the information 
(usually just one click away). Note that some websites require a free user account and 
password to access. If the reference is an electronic document in a format such as Acrobat 
PDF, MS Word or PowerPoint, the document is given a full bibliography entry in the 
Bibliography section and an abbreviated reference in the appropriate location in the document 
text. The Chicago Manual of Style 16th Edition was chosen since its abbreviated format for 
references provides the reader with some context (author and date) about the reference without 
having to bounce back and forth between the main document and the bibliography (a 
shortcoming of the IEEE numbering format). No paper-only references were used, such as 
books, so the reader should be able to obtain all the references electronically if so inclined. 
2. Approach for scoping prior work for review 
A review of the vast amounts of NextGen literature produced since 2010 without a method 
for filtering with respect to MBT is untenable. Unfortunately, MBT itself is rarely used in the 
literature and TBO is a buzzword where its usage in paper titles and keywords often has little to 
do with TBO as a concept. To assist with scoping the literature review, the few existing TBO 
Concept of Operations (ConOps) documents were reviewed. The FAA produced a draft version 
in 2014 (FAA 2014d). It is unclear if a finalized version exists. The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) produced a draft TBO ConOps in 2015 (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015). While not a 
ConOps per se, Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) developed a set of mid-
term NextGen TBO scenarios to support further concept exploration (RTCA 2011) with a brief 
description of the concept elements. Lastly, NASA recently published an integrated gate-to-gate 
ConOps of which MBT represents the airborne portion (Johnson and Barmore 2016). 
Collectively, these documents were reviewed with the intention of identifying the concept 
elements to be explored further with this study. In addition, the down-selected concept elements 
were used to structure the report document, becoming the names of the sections within Section 
4 (e.g., user preferred routing, closed trajectories and closed trajectory clearances).  
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Once the concept elements within MBT were identified, search engines within American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE), and NASA publication libraries were utilized. In addition, Google searches of FAA, Air 
Traffic Management (ATM) Seminar, RTCA, Eurocontrol, and other websites were also 
performed. In both search approaches, different keyword combinations of the selected concept 
elements were employed to ensure relevant documents were not overlooked. In addition, 
aviation periodicals, such as Aviation Week and Space Technology, were searched to provide a 
more topical, industry perspective. A similar search process was utilized to discover relevant 
issues pertaining to the enabling technologies in Section 3. 
 
3. Enabling technologies and automation systems 
This section discusses the following key enabling technologies and automation systems for 
MBT including the planned timeline of needed capabilities (if available) for supporting MBT: 
 Aircraft/ANSP data communication 
o Controller-pilot data link communication (CPDLC) – original program 
o Data communication (Data Comm) – current program 
 Automatic dependent surveillance – contract (ADS-C) 
 Automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) 
 Flight Management System (FMS) 
 Electronic flight bag (EFB) 
 En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) 
 Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS) 
 Time-Based flow management (TBFM) 
 System Wide Information Management (SWIM) 
 In-flight connectivity (IFC) 
 Airborne Access to SWIM (AAtS) 
Where applicable, the sub-sections attempt to identify: 
 Enablers 
 Roadblocks to adopting the enabling technology/automation system 
 Negative impacts of roadblock on MBT 
 Specific implications for MBT 
3.1 Aircraft/ANSP data communication 
The FAA’s first efforts with aircraft/ANSP data communication began with American Airlines 
strongly advocating for its implementation based on their internal analysis showing the National 
Airspace System (NAS) hitting capacity limitations, including those caused by voice frequency 
congestion. The FAA and American Airlines began CPDLC field tests in Miami Center in 2003 
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with a limited set of messages (initial contact, transfer of communication, altimeter settings, and 
free-text messages) using Very High Frequency (VHF) data link (VDL) Mode 2. The benefits 
case focused on reduced voice frequency congestion at the sector level, which would thereby 
allow more aircraft in a sector. Unfortunately, Miami Center had limited overflights so this 
particular benefit was understated in the field tests. Furthermore, other airlines were not willing 
to equip because of their financially weak state in the aftermath of 9/11. The Inspector General 
wrote: 
For CPDLC benefits to exceed costs, FAA estimated that more than 200 equipped 
airplanes had to use CPDLC. Program documents note that FAA assumed at least 100 
aircraft would be equipped by the time CPDLC became operational in Miami, and 200 to 
400 would be equipped by the time the program was deployed nationwide. However, by 
mid-2003, only about 30 aircraft had been equipped. FAA was concerned about users’ 
ability and willingness to equip given the airline industry’s economic downturn in 2001. In 
2001, network carriers began incurring substantial net losses, accumulating to a total of 
$23.4 billion by the end of the first quarter of 2004. The financial health of the industry 
influenced FAA’s decision because FAA was relying on voluntary equipage (FAA 2004). 
Based on projections of air carrier equipage, the return on investment would not be reached 
until 2018. Given other FAA priorities, nationwide deployment of CPDLC was deferred despite 
broad agreement in the ATC community that data link “is the key architectural enabler of almost 
any future envisioned air traffic management system.” 1 
With CPDLC deferred in the US, Eurocontrol moved forward with their version of CPDLC 
through the Link 2000+ Programme. The Eurocontrol benefits case also focused on increased 
sector capacity due to reduced voice frequency congestion, but some European airspace was 
much closer to saturation compared to the US. To encourage early adoption, the first 15 airlines 
to equip were provided a financial subsidy of 20,000 euros per aircraft – this applied to about 
half of the 350 pioneer aircraft under Link 2000+.2 The pioneer aircraft provided early lessons 
learned across a broad range of flight operators. In addition, Eurocontrol imposed an equipage 
mandate on flight operators by 2015. However, due to an abnormal number of datalink 
disconnections, or provider aborts, the mandate has been delayed until 2020 to provide 
additional time to find solutions to the existing problems.3 
It is important to note that the FAA identified airborne reroutes as a benefit of CPDLC, but in 
the 2003 timeframe this benefit was not well understood. What was well understood is that voice 
communication of complex reroutes (e.g., reroutes involving significant changes to the airways 
and/or waypoints in the flight plan) is impractical for widespread use in the NAS as it is 
workload-intensive, prone to error, and increases voice frequency congestion. While the need 
for airborne reroutes seemed intuitively paramount, the benefits case would require significant 
fast-time modeling development to assess the benefit along with assumptions about the 
conditions in which reroutes would be warranted. Furthermore, airborne reroutes are subject to 
several dependencies that would be years away from implementation including: 1) a capability 
to send reroutes generated by TFMS to the applicable controller’s ERAM workstation; 2) a 
capability to generate reroutes in ERAM directly; 3) integration of ERAM and CPDLC to 
automatically compose reroute messages; and 4) integration of the FMS and CPDLC to enable 
auto-loading the reroutes into the FMS.  
                                                 
1 “A Tale of Two Data Links,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 14, 2003. 
http://archive.aviationweek.com/search?QueryTerm=A+Tale+of+Two+Data+Links&DocType=All&sort=  
2 http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/commercial/Europe-Moves-on-Datalink_10778.html  
3 http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2015-02-24/europe-postpones-controller-pilot-datalink-
mandate  
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Thus, in the 2003 timeframe, it is fair to say a benefits assessment for reroutes would have 
been a complex and expensive undertaking and it is understandable why the FAA focused on 
the simpler benefit of reduced voice frequency congestion instead. In a similar context, the fast-
time modeling analysis to support NASA’s Distributed Air/Ground Traffic Management (DAG-
TM) En Route Trajectory Negotiation concept element (conducted in 2002-2003) specifically did 
not address airborne rerouting around weather due to a lack of fast-time modeling capabilities in 
this area.4 In hindsight though, the FAA’s decision to defer nationwide deployment of CPDLC by 
almost a decade has been the key roadblock to operational MBT thus far. 
In 2012, the FAA began the nationwide deployment of a CPDLC capability (now referred to 
as Data Comm) with an award to Harris Corporation. The award includes administering an 
avionics equipage initiative with $80 million in incentive funding to supply early equipping 
airlines.5 Data Comm leverages Future Air Navigation System (FANS)-1/A and VDL-2 avionics, 
widely used in air transport and business aviation. The goal is to equip 1,900 airplanes by 2019. 
Eight air carriers committed through memorandums of agreement to equip their aircraft with 
Data Comm avionics under the incentive program. As of July 13, 2016, 867 aircraft have 
equipped under the incentive program. Another 820 are equipped outside of the incentive for a 
total of 1,687 equipped aircraft.6 
As of the end of 2016, Data Comm was operational in all 56 ATC towers (20 months ahead 
of the schedule), enabling delivery of departure clearances (DCLs) (full route clearances and 
revisions) to aircraft on the ground.7 A key benefit of DCL is that “the controller is able to amend 
the clearance as volume or weather conditions change, thereby eliminating the voice bottleneck 
during these high workload conditions.” 8 In these voice bottleneck conditions, equipped aircraft 
avoid significant delay. 
The focus of the Data Comm program is now shifting to en route services (see Figure 1). 
Figure 2 shows the most recent FAA Communications Roadmap (top) (FAA 2016b) and a 
roadmap from 2015 that identifies message types (bottom). Initial en route services will become 
available starting in 2019, thus making datalinked airborne reroutes possible. 
 
Figure 1. Data Comm program milestones from the NextGen Implementation Plan (FAA 
2016c) 
 
                                                 
4 Conversation between NASA Technical Monitor and the author, who worked on the benefits analysis of DAG-TM 
En Route Trajectory Negotiation concept element. 
5 http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2012-09-24/faa-taps-harris-build-nationwide-data-comm-
network  
6 https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/update/progress_and_plans/data_comm/  
7 https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/snapshots/priorities/?area=dcom  
8 http://interactive.aviationtoday.com/nextgen-data-comm-facilitates-digital-dcl/  
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Figure 2. FAA Data Comm Roadmaps 
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To support more advanced data communications services, the FAA will support future use of 
Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) avionics. The ATN was developed through 
ICAO to provide a more universally capable and reliable data communication system. After en 
route services deployment in the NAS with FANS 1/A and VDL-2, the FAA will support the 
transition to ATN, referred to as Baseline 2. Capabilities to support TBO-related message types 
will be available starting in 2024. Data link message types are described in Annex B of DO-
351A (RTCA SC-214 2016b). 
3.1.1 Enablers 
 Government provides financial incentives for flight operators to equip. 
 Widely viewed as the key enabling technology for NextGen capabilities. 
3.1.2 Roadblocks to adopting CPDLC/Data Comm 
During the CPDLC program, the FAA had identified airborne reroutes as a benefit 
mechanism, but did not have the modeling tools to assess the benefit. Instead, the benefit 
assessment focused on the reduced voice frequency congestion benefit mechanism and 
associated increase in en route sector capacity. However, en route sector capacity is not a 
major bottleneck in the NAS and it is also not a tangible benefit to users. Had the FAA included 
the reroutes benefit mechanism, the users may have seen tangible benefits - particularly 
benefits to support equipping.  
3.1.3 Negative impacts of roadblock on MBT 
Without Data Comm, voice communication of complex reroutes is impractical for widespread 
use in the NAS. The nine-year deferment of data link capabilities has slowed MBT concept 
element progress. 
3.1.4 Specific implications for MBT 
History may repeat itself if the MBT cost/benefits assessment makes the same mistake as 
the original CPDLC cost/benefits assessment. To mitigate these concerns, MBT should: 
 Identify benefit mechanisms that are tangible to users. 
 Identify methods for determining hard-to-assess benefit mechanisms. 
 Provide financial incentives for flight operators to equip (as was done with the 2012 Data 
Comm program and with the European Link 2000+ Programme). 
3.2 ADS-C 
ADS-C is a method of surveillance that is dependent on downlink reports from an aircraft's 
avionics that occur automatically in accordance with contracts established between the ATC 
ground system and the aircraft's avionics. Reports are sent according to a contract type: on 
demand, on a periodic basis, or when triggered by an event (e.g. change of waypoints and/or 
constraints, deviation of estimates more than defined thresholds, etc.). ADS-C is supported by 
FANS-equipped aircraft. Boeing developed FANS-1 and Airbus developed FANS-A; collectively 
they are referred to as FANS-1/A. 
While the original purpose of FANS1/A ADS-C was to provide accurate surveillance reports 
in remote and oceanic areas, a lesser known aspect is that it also has the ability to provide 
basic trajectory intent down-link referred to as intermediate projected intent (IPI). Since a clear 
concept of use for IPI never existed, its content is limited (next 10 waypoints) and its format has 
many limitations (Bronsvoort et al. 2016). However, a new, more complete framework to provide 
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the trajectory intent of the FMS has been developed. This trajectory intent information will be 
contained in a new ADS-C report referred to as the Extended Projected Profile (EPP) report. 
The EPP report represents the FMS trajectory intent through a maximum of 128 waypoints or 
pseudo waypoints9 with associated estimates and constraints. The EPP message, shown in 
Table 1, is defined in Annex B of DO-351A (RTCA SC-214 2016b): 
Table 1. EPP Message Content* 
Waypoint latitude and longitude Flight level constraint  
Flight level Speed constraint  
Fix name Time constraint (e.g., Required Time of 
Arrival [RTA])  
ETA Gross mass  
Estimated speed  Trajectory intent status: Booleans for each of 
the following: lateral flight managed, vertical 
flight managed, speed managed, and time 
managed. 
Vertical type: top of climb (TOC), top of 
descent (TOD), start of climb, start of 
descent, start of level flight, start of speed 
change, end of speed change, speed limit, 
and cross over. 
Lateral type: flyby, fixed radius transition, 
offset start, offset reached, return to parent 
path initiation, offset end, offset, overfly, and 
followed by discontinuity. 
* Note that all fields are optional except for waypoint latitude and longitude. 
 
3.2.1 Enablers 
 Agreement between stakeholders on the requirements for Baseline 2, allowing avionics 
suppliers to bring it to market. 
3.2.2 Roadblocks to adopting Baseline 2 ADS-C EPP 
A potential roadblock to MBT is that there is no mandate for ADS-C EPP. Aircraft that are 
equipped with FANS 1/A, which supports basic ADS-C, will need to upgrade to what is referred 
to as a Baseline 2 for an EPP capability, which Boeing says “is going to be prohibitively 
expensive.” The FAA has not committed to widespread ground deployment, and without that, 
Boeing does not believe there is a business case for B2 (Nguyen 2016).  
3.2.3 Negative impacts of roadblocks on MBT 
ADS-C EPP appears to be the only capability on the horizon with any momentum that can 
be utilized for sharing complete (or near-complete) FMS trajectory intent with ANSP ground 
systems. For aircraft without EPP, managing aircraft trajectory prediction uncertainty will be 
more difficult, lessening the effectiveness of MBT. 
                                                 
9 Pseudo waypoints are waypoints inserted into the flight plan by the FMS for flight management purposes. Pseudo 
waypoints include items such as top of climb, top of descent, and change of speed. They are updated dynamically by 
the FMS according to the actual profile being flown. 
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3.2.4 Specific implications for MBT 
The MBT ConOps should consider developing a concept variant that assumes ADS-C EPP 
intent will not be available for high percentage of aircraft.  
In addition, the same lessons learned in the Data Comm section apply here: 
 Identify benefit mechanisms that are tangible to users. 
 Identify methods for determining hard-to-assess benefit mechanisms. 
 Provide financial incentives for flight operators to equip. 
3.3 ADS-B 
ADS–B is a surveillance technology in which an aircraft determines its position via Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and periodically broadcasts it, enabling it to be tracked by ground-
based systems. The information can be received by air traffic control ground stations and by 
other aircraft to provide situational awareness and, in the future, allow for self-separation. ADS-
B broadcasts the latitude, longitude, velocity (relative to the earth), geometric altitude (height of 
the vehicle above the earth ellipsoid), and pressure altitude every second. 
ADS-B consists of ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. ADS-B Out refers to the broadcasting of 
information. ADS-B In refers to an aircraft receiving the broadcasts and also receiving 
messages from the ground network (see below). The FAA has mandated through 14 CFR 
91.225 and 14 CFR 91.227 that aircraft operating in airspace that now requires a Mode C 
transponder must be equipped with ADS-B Out by January 1, 2020. ADS-B In is not mandated. 
The mandate requires aircraft operating in Class A airspace to broadcast data with a Mode S, 
1090 Extended Squitter (1090 ES). Aircraft operating in designated airspace exclusively below 
18,000 feet MSL can broadcast the required information with either 1090 ES or the Universal 
Access Transceiver (UAT) on 978 MHz. Aircraft equipped with UAT will also receive significant 
weather activity information, Notices to Airmen (NOTAM), and pilot reports via the Flight 
Information Services–Broadcast (FIS-B) service – a free service provided by the FAA. 
Since aircraft can broadcast on one of two frequencies, Automatic Dependent Surveillance–
Rebroadcast (ADS-R) is part of the ground infrastructure. ADS-R collects position information 
broadcast on each frequency and rebroadcasts it on the other frequency. Traffic Information 
Services–Broadcast (TIS-B) is another part of the ground infrastructure. Since it will be a few 
years before all aircraft are equipped with ADS-B Out, TIS-B broadcasts the position of non-
ADS-B Out aircraft that ground surveillance radar detects. Combined, TIS-B and ADS-R provide 
ADS-B In-equipped aircraft with a more complete airspace and airport surface traffic picture. 
ADS-R delivers traffic data within a 15 nm radius, 5,000 feet above or below relative to the 
receiving aircraft's position. TIS-B provides traffic data within a 15 nm radius, 3,500 feet above 
or below.10 
The combination of ADS-B Out, with higher update rate and improved position accuracy 
compared to ground surveillance radar, and ADS-B In with a cockpit display of traffic information 
(CDTI) enables NextGen concepts such as closely spaced parallel operations and advanced 
interval management. Another example is strategic conflict management where a controller 
provides a clearance consisting of a RTA, associated waypoint, and identification of the aircraft 
to avoid, which the pilot then can correlate to the correct target on the CDTI. 
                                                 
10 https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/update/operator_investments_and_airports/operator_investments/adsb/  
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Note that there is currently no plan for ADS-B to support broadcast of aircraft intent 
information that would facilitate MBT concepts. Originally, DO-260 (RTCA SC-186 2000) 
specified that 1090 ES would support reporting of aircraft intent for the aircraft’s next two 
trajectory change points (TCPs) (where change refers to changes in altitude, heading, speed or 
any combination thereof). Note that having only two TCPs for aircraft intent has limited 
applications for MBT, but it could improve shorter time horizon concepts such as conflict probe 
performance. Regardless, the FAA had concerns about congestion on the 1090 MHz frequency 
in high density airspace and was trying to reduce the types of reports that ADS-B would have to 
support (ADS–B Aviation Rulemaking Committee 2008). Trajectory change reports were 
subsequently removed from DO-260A. While the current version, DO-260B (RTCA SC-186 
2011), still contains an appendix describing trajectory change reports, there is currently no plan 
to resuscitate aircraft intent. Similarly, a Target State report is defined in DO-260B that would 
identify the current flight segment target states such as target altitude of climbing or descending 
aircraft or target heading for turning aircraft, but there is currently no implementation schedule 
for this capability. 
Lastly, Aireon, a joint venture between Iridium Communications and several ANSPs, is 
developing a space-based ADS-B service by installing ADS-B receivers on Iridium NEXT 
satellites. The service is planned to be operational in 2018 and will consist of 66 operational 
low-earth-orbit satellites providing a global aircraft surveillance capability.11 Initially, Nav Canada 
plans to use this service to manage North Atlantic oceanic airspace.12 
3.3.1 Enablers 
 The key enabler is the 2020 FAA mandate for ADS-B Out. 
 Best-equipped, best-served operational practices can encourage upgrades to ADS-B In. 
 NextGen Equipage Fund for GA aircraft ($550M) with 15-year contract agreements and 
federal loan guarantees to pay for equipment upgrades.13 
3.3.2 Roadblocks to adopting ADS-B In 
While ADS-B Out is mandated, ADS-B In is not so what will entice users to equip? The 
NextGen Equipage Paradox refers to the following: 
Despite the potential for significant benefits from NextGen, airlines and other operators 
are not making the needed aircraft equipage investments. There are still uncertainties in 
NextGen requirements and benefits. This means that in the end, those operators who 
are last to equip with NextGen avionics will reap the most financial benefit, while those 
operators who are first will get the lowest returns at a far greater risk. 14 
3.3.3 Negative impacts of roadblocks on MBT 
Any MBT concept elements that require self-spacing, self-merging, and/or self-separating 
will not be feasible for aircraft without ADS-B In. 
3.3.4 Specific implications for MBT 
Same lessons learned in the Data Comm section apply here: 
 Identify benefit mechanisms that are tangible to users. 
                                                 
11 https://aireon.com/company/  
12 http://www.navcanada.ca/en/products-and-services/pages/on-board-operational-initiatives-ads-b.aspx  
13 http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/Congress-Mandates-ADS-B-Loan-Program-225480-1.html  
14 http://www.rtca.org/Files/NAC%20Recommendations/NAC%20EquipAdHoc%20FinalApprvd.pdf  
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 Identify methods for determining hard-to-assess benefit mechanisms. 
 Provide financial incentives for flight operators to equip. 
3.4 FMS 
The FMS is the avionic automation that enables an aircraft to follow a lateral and vertical 
profile with optional specified speeds for each segment of the profile. It has the capability to 
optimize the trajectory based on a cost index. The cost index enables the pilot to minimize time 
of flight or minimize fuel burn or the continuum between these two extremes along a pilot-
specified profile. The FMS does not have a capability to generate wind-optimal routes – it can 
only optimize based on the specified lateral profile. There are many variations in capabilities 
between FMS models – for example, most FMS models support RTA, which is a key capability 
for NextGen time-based operations. This difference in capabilities creates a mixed capability 
situation (analogous to mixed equipage) where some aircraft will be able to support NextGen 
concepts and others will either require explicit controller instructions to replicate the behavior 
(e.g., an aircraft meeting an RTA or a controller giving an Efficient Descent Advisor (EDA) 
clearance to the aircraft). 
Looking to the future, integration of Data Comm, ADS-C EPP, context management, and 
advanced FMS to support NextGen capabilities is referred to as Baseline 2. This integration 
requires substantial changes to the FMS including new flight plan uplinks and loading rules and 
RTA changes. Baseline 2B would include additions for Dynamic Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) and Advanced Interval Management (A-IM) procedures. Boeing states the 
following about the cost of Baseline 2B (Nguyen 2016): 
Current iteration (B2B) is going to be prohibitively expensive: 
 Software development alone will exceed FANS-1 and ATN costs combined for each 
model 
 Hardware changes probably necessary on some models too 
 To allow backward compatibility, airline will have to purchase FANS-1 and FANS-2 
features as well as pay for this 
 Ancillary equipment costs (e.g. A-IM equipment) will be in addition 
Boeing believes Baseline 2B will only be available on aircraft produced in the mid-2020 
timeframe, further exacerbating the mixed capability situation. 
3.4.1 Roadblocks to adopting advanced FMS capabilities 
For older aircraft with older avionics, FMS upgrades are not possible because of the 
inherent differences with newer technology. Looking to the future, Boeing says Baseline 2B “is 
going to be prohibitively expensive.” Air carriers have had bad experiences in the past where 
their investment in avionics upgrade have not been utilized and thus not provided any benefit 
because the corresponding investments on the ANSP side did not materialize. The FAA has not 
committed to widespread ground deployment, and without that, Boeing does not believe there is 
a business case for Baseline 2 (Nguyen 2016).  
3.4.2 Negative impacts of roadblocks on MBT 
The wide range of FMS capabilities in the NAS that currently exists and will continue to exist 
for decades into the future results in a mixed capability environment. The MBT concept will have 
to consider the best approach for addressing the mixed capability environment on a concept 
19 
element by concept element basis. In other words, what does best equipped, best served mean 
for each MBT concept element? 
3.5 EFB 
EFB gets its name from the traditional pilot's flight bag of documents, including operating 
manuals and navigational charts, which pilots would carry to the cockpit. The EFB is the 
replacement of those documents in a digital format. The FAA defines an EFB as an electronic 
display system intended primarily for flight deck or cabin crew member use that includes the 
hardware and software necessary to support an intended function (FAA 2014a). EFBs can be 
portable or installed.15 Portable EFBs such as iPads can only support Type A or Type B 
software applications (see Table 2) such that failure of the EFB will not directly affect the 
operation of the aircraft. Installed EFBs are fully certified as part of the aircraft avionics system 
and are integrated with aircraft systems such as the FMS. These advanced systems are also 
able to display an aircraft's position on navigational charts, depict real-time weather, and 
perform many complex flight-planning tasks. Installed EFBs support Type C software 
applications. 
Table 2. Description of types of EFB software applications from FAA AC 120-76C. 
Type A software applications are those paper replacement applications primarily intended for use 
during flight planning, on the ground, or during noncritical phases of flight having a failure condition 
classification considered to be a minor hazard or less. 
Type B software applications are those paper replacement applications that provide the aeronautical 
information required to be accessible for each flight at the pilot station and are primarily intended for 
use during flight planning and all phases of flight. They may also include miscellaneous applications 
(e.g., aircraft cabin and exterior surveillance video displays, maintenance applications) having a failure 
condition classification considered to be a minor hazard or less. 
Type C software applications are approved by the FAA using RTCA/DO-178 or another acceptable 
means. These are “non-EFB” software applications found in avionics and include intended functions for 
communications, navigation, and surveillance that require FAA design, production, and installation 
approval. Type C applications are approved software for surface and airborne functions with a failure 
condition classification considered to be a major hazard or higher. 
 
There is significant potential for new Type B applications that leverage IFC and the Aircraft 
Interface Device (AID), which provide secure interfaces between portable EFBs and onboard 
avionics and aircraft systems. Applications that utilize real-time access to weather and other 
dynamic information can increase operational efficiencies including fuel and time savings and 
mitigations to impending turbulence.16,17 
While more expensive than portable EFBs, installed EFBs with Type C applications are 
expected to continue to have a role in NextGen applications. For one, they may prove to be a 
less costly approach than integrated avionics in the forward field of view of the cockpit: 
There is also a future-proofing aspect of the nascent ADS-B In application. While those 
new applications could be hosted in the forward panel, “then you’d have to pay fees to 
                                                 
15 This is based on the draft version of AC 120-76D. The previous Class 1, 2 and 3 categories of EFBs in AC 120-
76C have been replaced by two new categories: portable and installed to try and clear up previous confusion 
16 http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/EFBs/Aircraft-Interface-Technology-Continues-to-Expand-With-Latest-737-
Approval_88337.html  
17 http://interactive.aviationtoday.com/avionicsmagazine/october-november-2016/coming-off-the-production-line-is-
your-aircrafts-gps-receiver-accurate-enough-for-ads-b/  
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the integrated avionics companies,” says Dewar. Legacy EFB providers have a slight 
edge because their systems are not in the forward field of view of the pilot and hence 
can be less costly to update, even though the devices can be certified as an additional 
avionics display. That makes the EFB an ideal candidate to host NextGen applications, 
which are evolving and progressing as ADS-B Out surveillance comes into force via 
mandates globally and airlines, albeit slowly, begin purchasing ADS-B In equipment as 
well.18 
In addition, installed EFBs may provide more flexibility than the forward display alone (from 
the same article): 
New models for software security are also giving traditional EFBs more flexibility. The 
Astronautics Corp. of America’s Nexis Flight-Intelligence System has software-only 
partitioning that allows operators to have certified and non-certified (consumer) 
applications running simultaneously in the same side display unit. The non-certified side 
can often be updated or loaded with no recertification, reducing costs and giving airlines 
the freedom to write their own applications. “On the forward display, no one is going to 
let you touch that code,” says Cundiff. “If you want a change, you have to go back 
through the [original equipment manufacturer] and decide on a certification plan. The bill 
you get at the end is going to have a lot of zeros on the end of it.” 
3.5.1  Enablers 
 IFC, AAtS 
 May prove to be a more flexible and less costly means for getting NextGen capabilities 
into the cockpit compared to implementation through traditional avionics 
3.6 ERAM 
ERAM processes flight and surveillance data, enables efficient controller-pilot 
communications, and generates detailed display data to controllers. ERAM combines ICAO 
flight plan information and processing with surveillance data from ADS-B, wide area 
multilateration (WAM), and radar to automate a number of air traffic control functions such as 
tracking aircraft, providing conflict alerts and minimum safe altitude warnings, and recording air 
traffic events. 
ERAM performs enhanced weather data processing, including weather grids containing 
wind, temperature, and pressure data for use by trajectory modeling and display at the controller 
positions. ERAM displays mosaic Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) and processes 
and distributes text-based meteorological information to the controller positions. ERAM provides 
conflict probe and alert notification with a 20 minute look-ahead for aircraft/aircraft and 
aircraft/airspace conflicts with a trial planning tool for what-if modeling of potential flight plan 
amendments (Ng 2011). 
Each ERAM system can track 1,900 aircraft at a time, compared with 1,100 for the legacy 
HOST system. ERAM is now available in all 20 en route Centers in the contiguous US, with the 
last two, Jacksonville and Atlanta Centers, available since September 2014. In March 2015, the 
20 ERAM sites achieved operational readiness, which signified the full commissioning of ERAM 
into the NAS and allowed the FAA to begin decommissioning the HOST system. ERAM serves 
as the platform upon which NextGen programs such as data sharing, Data Comm and TBO will 
reside. 
                                                 
18 http://aviationweek.com/aftermarket-solutions/next-generation-efbs-integral-nextgen-cockpit  
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Airborne Reroute (ABRR), a key enabler for MBT, became operationally available in 
December 2016. ABRR provides the ability to electronically send TFMS-generated airborne 
reroutes to ERAM enabling controllers to issue reroutes to pilots via voice. As mentioned in 
Section 3.1, the associated Data Comm functionality becomes available starting in 2019 (FAA 
2016c). 
The FAA’s latest NAS Target Top Level Systems Requirement Document (FAA 2014c) 
identifies the following ERAM capabilities that would be relevant to MBT: 
 Initial Conflict Resolution Advisories (2019) 
 Traffic Management Initiatives with Flight-Specific Trajectories (2017) 
 Support for TBFM’s Point-in-Space Metering (2018) 
3.7 TFMS 
In today’s NAS, there is not one encompassing tool that supports the needs of traffic 
management. The primary system designated to support traffic management is TFMS. It 
consists of centralized trajectory modeling capabilities, logic, and data as part of the TFMS core, 
and a decision support tool (DST) called the Traffic Situation Display (TSD). The TSD is used by 
traffic managers across the NAS and provides a NAS-wide view of current and future traffic 
demand, along with some system constraints. Reroutes, flow evaluation areas (FEAs), flow 
constrained areas (FCAs), and Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) initiatives are 
all modeled and issued via the TSD. 
The TSD allows the traffic manager to graphically display the current position of all 
instrument flight rule (IFR) flights. The TSD also uses a system of layers to display the current 
status of alerts and weather, as well as map overlays such as sectors, fixes, navigational aids 
(NAVAIDs), and airports. TSD allows communicating potential reroutes and constrained areas 
of airspace with other facilities and remote users of TSD (CSC 2012). In addition, TSD is used 
to create and examine FEAs and FCAs for demand/capacity imbalances. FEAs can be used for 
determining miles-in-trail (MIT) restrictions. FEAs can also be used as a precursor to actually 
constraining traffic through the FCA. An FCA is needed to support airspace flow program (AFP) 
or CTOP traffic management initiative (TMI) functions. The Monitor Alert function of the TSD is 
used to determine sector imbalances based on projected traffic counts and the sector’s monitor 
alert parameter (MAP) (see Figure 3). Sector traffic counts that exceed their MAP values may 
result in a TMI response. 
Flight Schedule Monitor (FSM) is a separate client/server application used to model and 
issue other types of TMIs, to include AFPs, ground delay programs (GDPs), and ground stops 
(GSs), along with additional tools for modifying those events to include compressions and 
blankets. FSM is considered part of TFMS from a program perspective, but technically, it is a 
different application and communicates with the TFMS core via custom interfaces. It is expected 
that the FSM capabilities will eventually be absorbed within the TSD. 
FSM monitors scheduled flight arrivals and departures from an airport, or flights entering and 
departing from defined volumes of airspace (i.e., FEA and FCA) to identify demand/capacity 
imbalances (Metron Aviation, Inc. No date provided). When an imbalance exists, traffic 
management specialists at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) are able 
to model different TMIs that would be able to alleviate the imbalance, including analyze 
combinations of GSs, GDPs, and AFPs to determine the best approach to address the 
imbalance. FSM updates demand in the flight schedule display approximately every five 
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minutes to keep the picture current. FSM users can also examine historical data to replay a 
day's events and analyze the effects of all traffic management programs. 
 
Figure 3. TSD with Monitor Alert function displaying green, yellow and red sectors 
Both the TSD and FSM have reduced functionality versions called thin clients available to 
flight operations centers (FOCs) that are part of the FAA’s collaborative decision making (CDM) 
partnership. The thin clients facilitate a common situational awareness among the ATCSCC and 
users in the NAS. For example, FOCs can model the effects of the TMI and decide whether to 
alter their own operations by cancelling, delaying, or rerouting flights.  
The last component of TFMS is the National Traffic Management Log (NTML), which is both 
an application and an archive. Traffic managers use NTML to coordinate TMIs between facilities 
and then log the TMIs, which are captured in the archive. The NTML archive includes TMIs 
issued by the TSD, FSM, TBFM, and the Departure Spacing Program (DSP) (Shisler, Leiden, et 
al. 2014). 
The FAA’s latest NAS Target Top Level Systems Requirement Document (FAA 2014c) 
identifies the following planned TFMS capabilities: 
 Integrate TMI Modeling 
 Airport Acceptance Rate Decision Support 
 Improve Demand Predictions 
 Arrival Route Availability Planning 
 Integrated Departure Route Planning 
 Improve Special Activity Airspace (SAA)-Based Flow Predictions 
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3.8 TBFM 
TBFM uses time instead of distance to help controllers sequence air traffic. Compared to the 
traditional miles-in-trail process, TBFM provides a more efficient traffic flow that reduces fuel 
burn and increases traffic capacity. 
Departure Scheduling – TBFM enables traffic managers to control arrival times more 
efficiently at destination airports by adjusting departure times at originating airports. 
En Route Departure Capability – Traffic managers also adjust departure times for more 
efficient integration of flights into the en route stream. 
Airborne Metering – TBFM generates a scheduled time over an arrival point. Controllers will 
use vectoring, holding, or speed directives to deliver aircraft at the scheduled time. 
Arrival Management/Situational Awareness – TBFM shares runway demand projections, 
route assignments, and arrival progress. With this enhanced situational awareness, traffic 
managers adjust routes and spacing to manage air traffic flows more effectively. 
TBFM also calculates speed advisories for the ERAM displays so controllers can efficiently 
manage flow, and place each aircraft at the correct place and time to initiate an optimized profile 
descent (OPD) more than 100 miles from arrival airports. 
Future work is moving TBFM into en route operations to replace MIT restrictions, such as 
pre-defined meter points along National Playbook routes for use during weather events (FAA 
2013c). 
3.9 SWIM 
In the past, the state of the art for connecting two systems required a fixed network 
connection and custom, point-to-point, application-level data interfaces. SWIM reduces the high 
degree of interdependence among systems and unique, point-to-point application interfaces. 
SWIM's approach allows software applications in the NAS to interact with one another through 
information services that can be accessed without knowledge of an application's underlying 
platform implementation. This simplifies interface requirements to existing NAS systems and 
ensures new systems can be built with minimum technology (hardware, software, and data 
definition) constraints. SWIM producers and the types of information they provide are shown in 
Table 3. It is relatively straightforward for external consumers such as FOCs or research 
institutions to get access to SWIM.19 Note that most if not all of this information would be highly 
valued by FOCs and pilots for planning, monitoring real-time activity, and shared situational 
awareness with the ANSP. 
Table 3. SWIM producers and the information provided.20 
Producer Description of information 
AIM FNS Aeronautical Information Management (AIM) Federal NOTAM System (FNS) provides NOTAMs 
AIM SAA 
Provides Airport reference and configuration data, including: definitions and 
schedule information for SAA, Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR), procedure 
(Area Navigation [RNAV]/ RNP) data, and obstacles. 
                                                 
19 https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/programs/swim/products/getConnected/ 
20 https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/programs/swim/products/ 
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Producer Description of information 
AIM 
Modernization 
(AIMM) Segment 
2 
AIMM Segment 2 (S2) will modernize the ingestion, integration, management, and 
distribution of aeronautical information by establishing the Aeronautical Common 
Services (ACS) and a one-stop-shop (OSS) customer portal. ACS and OSS will 
streamline dissemination and updates to Airport reference and configuration data, 
SAA, FNS, and other types of aeronautical information. 
CSS-Wx 
Common Support Services-Weather (CSS-Wx) will modernize, centralize and 
streamline distribution of weather within the NAS. CSS-Wx will replace existing 
data feeds from the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS), Corridor 
Integrated Weather System (CIWS), Enhanced Weather Information Network 
Server (WINS) Dissemination (EWD), Weather Message Switching Center 
Replacement (WMSCR) System, and Weather and Radar Processor (WARP). 
ITWS 
ITWS provides a variety of weather information in graphic and textual forms, such 
as wind shear and microburst predictions, storm cell and lightning information, and 
terminal area winds aloft. 
NCR The NAS Common Reference (NCR) Service will integrate, aggregate, correlate, and filter a variety of NAS data to form spatial and temporal relationships. 
SFDPS 
SWIM Flight Data Publication Service (SFDPS) provides a variety of En Route 
flight data, such as flight plans, beacon codes, and handoff status. SFDPS also 
disseminates data regarding airspaces, such as Sector configuration data, route 
status, SAA status, and altimeter settings, and General data including ERAM 
status information. 
STDDS 
SWIM Terminal Data Distribution System (STDDS) provides surface movement 
data, approach surveillance radar data from Standard Terminal Automation 
Replacement System (STARS) systems, Runway Visual Range (RVR), and a 
variety of departure event data. 
TBFM TBFM provides a variety of aircraft metering information, airport configuration and adaptation data. 
TFDM Terminal Flight Data Manager (TFDM) will provide a variety of Airport information, Surface and flight data, and flow information. 
TFMS 
Through Traffic Flow Management Data (TFMData), TFMS provides the 
equivalent of the legacy Aircraft Situation Display to Industry (ASDI) data (retired 
in 2016), which includes aircraft scheduling, routing, and positional information. In 
addition, TFMData provides AFP, ATCSCC Advisories, CTOP, FCA FEA, GDP, 
GS, Reroutes, airport runway configuration and rates, airport deicing status, 
restrictions, and Route Availability Planning Tool (RAPT) timeline data. 
WARP/EWD WARP provides NEXRAD data via the NAS Enterprise Messaging Service (NEMS) 
WMSCR WMSCR collects, processes, stores, and disseminates textual aviation weather products such as Pilot Reports (PIREPs) and Altimeter data. 
 
3.9.1 Enablers 
 Individual SWIM producers becoming compliant with SWIM standards. 
3.9.2 Roadblocks to adopting SWIM 
The following roadblock was identified in Wilber (2014): 
Global harmonization across SWIM’s and ANSP’s has not yet begun.… US definition of 
SWIM… differs significantly from Euro-SWIM. 
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3.9.3 Negative impacts of roadblock on MBT 
Dual standards for SWIM may limit international air carrier effectiveness with respect to 
certain MBT concept elements such as trajectory negotiations because of incomplete 
information. 
3.9.4 Specific implications for MBT 
SWIM has vast potential for improving information sharing across stakeholders that has 
been impossible until recently. Existing concept elements should be reexamined to determine if 
newly available information can be leveraged to improve the concept element. 
3.10 IFC 
IFC is the term used by providers of airborne internet services. IFC can be provided by 
either ground-based (a network of transmission towers pointed upwards) or satellite-based 
systems. While primarily intended for passenger internet, the cockpit is now able to leverage 
IFC through EFBs. Internet speeds are expected to increase dramatically in the near-term. For 
example, domestic industry leader GoGo, originally a ground-based service, recently launched 
a 2Ku satellite-based service. The network reaches about 70 Mbps per aircraft and will possibly 
be as fast as 100 Mbps in the near future. Currently, each IFC provider installs proprietary 
equipment on the aircraft with signed long-term contracts, locking in the flight operator and 
making it difficult to switch to another IFC provider due to the aircraft down-time required.21 A 
new IFC provider, SmartSky, is developing a ground-based system and advertising 4G speeds 
without the latency associated with high-bandwidth satellite systems.22  
3.10.1 Roadblocks to adopting IFC 
High cost inhibits low-cost carriers from implementing IFC. 
3.10.2 Negative impacts of roadblock on MBT 
Low-cost carriers may not be able to leverage EFB applications and SWIM information. 
Thus, certain benefits of MBT (e.g., effective trajectory negotiation) that rely on dynamic 
information may not be attainable to them. 
3.11 AAtS 
AAtS leverages information from SWIM producers to support operational strategies and 
decisions that are not considered safety critical. Below is a brief description of the AAtS 
concept: 
AAtS is an air-ground solution that will leverage the SWIM infrastructure to give flight 
crews access to relevant, NAS data. The data delivered to flight crews via AAtS will 
come from a common infrastructure – SWIM. However, not all SWIM data will be 
available through AAtS in order to protect proprietary information and security. The 
information that will be available will increase common Situational Awareness (SA) 
between flight crews and ground operations, while promoting strategic planning and 
more informed decision making. AAtS will also be the mechanism that will afford 
airspace users the ability to provide near real-time input, such as atmospheric 
conditions, to ground operations and systems. Together, this timely, bi-directional 
communication link will help create a shared NAS picture and is expected to contribute 
                                                 
21 https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-gogo-airplane-wireless-internet/  
22 http://smartskynetworks.com/  
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to increased predictability, flexibility, and efficiency within the NAS (Booz, Allen, 
Hamilton 2013). 
The FOC may receive advisory information through AAtS via the vendor-managed AAtS 
data management service (DMS). The DMS accesses raw SWIM data that will manage, filter, 
validate and distribute relevant information in a usable format to customers. The FOC may also 
access SWIM data directly via the NAS boundary protection services (security gateway). In this 
case, the FOC acts as its own DMS. 
Since ADS-B does not provide intent information, AAtS may prove to be the technology that 
facilitates aircraft receiving intent information about other aircraft via the flight plans published 
by TFMData. 
3.11.1 Enablers 
 IFC, SWIM, vendor DMS providers. 
3.11.2 Roadblocks to adopting AAtS 
The following roadblocks were identified in Wilber (2014): 
• Potential over regulation of currently unregulated information to facilitate government 
business goals may increase investment costs and reduce or kill business cases of 
many aircraft operators and potential DMS providers. 
• Slow adoption of AAtS approach may result in many interim sub-optimal, often 
competing stove piped solutions that impede the rate of AAtS implementation and 
take up. 
3.11.3 Negative impacts of roadblock on MBT 
Certain benefits of MBT such as effective trajectory negotiation will not be fully realized if the 
adoption rate of AAtS is slow. 
4. Concept elements to support MBT 
Review of existing TBO ConOps (see Section 2) documentation identified an initial list of 
concept elements expected to be relevant to MBT; in particular, the ICAO ConOps (ICAO-
ATMRPP 2015) provided sufficient details. These concept elements are described in more 
detail in the following subsections: 
 Information needs and sharing among stakeholders 
 Closed trajectories and closed trajectory clearances 
 Trajectory negotiation 
 Managing residual trajectory uncertainty 
 Improved climb and descent profiles 
 User preferred routing and user preferred trajectories 
4.1 Stakeholders’ information needs and sharing 
Much of the inefficiency in today’s air transportation system can be attributed to a lack of 
timely and accurate exchange of information across relevant actors. This subsection identifies 
the information available to one actor that is needed by one or more other actors that is 
currently unavailable or outdated under today’s operations. 
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The actors (and their associated automation in parenthesis) with the most relevance to MBT 
are the pilot (FMS, EFB), controller (ERAM, TBFM), FOC dispatchers and ATC coordinators 
(flight planning and fleet management), Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) Traffic 
Management Unit (TMU) personnel (TFMS/TSD, TBFM), and ATCSCC personnel (TFMS/TSD 
and TFMS/FSM). Due to the potentially vast scope of this topic, the description of information 
needs and sharing is limited in scope to MBT research areas. The sharing of information 
between actors in a MBT environment is depicted in Figure 4 (FAA 2014d). 
 
Figure 4. Information Flow in Support of MBT (FAA 2014d). 
4.1.1 Pilot 
Today’s pilots perform extensive pre-flight planning prior to filing their IFR flight plan. 
However, once onboard the aircraft they are cut off from a great deal of information about what 
is occurring in the NAS. Pilots receive local area information from listening to local area VHF 
broadcasts and from onboard sensors such as weather radar, collision avoidance, and ADS-B. 
Pilots may receive updated information from their FOC about downstream conditions impacting 
their flight, but otherwise they have little insight into strategic impacts. Thus, as unplanned 
events unfold (e.g., weather, outages, early release of SAA), inefficiencies arise. In these 
situations, lack of dynamic information hinders the pilot’s ability to improve flight efficiency 
(Wilber 2014). 
NASA’s Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Request (TASAR) ConOps (Henderson 2013) 
addresses the above shortcomings. The TASAR ConOps identifies the following types of 
information that can be gathered automatically to calculate a more efficient trajectory: 
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 Surveillance through ADS-B In – receives traffic information sent via ADS-B Out, ADS-R, 
and TIS-B. 
 Surveillance through AAtS – while the TASAR ConOps called out ASDI, ASDI is no 
longer supported as of April, 2016, and has been recently replaced by TFMData (see 
Section 3.9). This includes flight plan, flight plan amendments, and current aircraft 
position for all aircraft in the NAS. 
 Convective weather information – through onboard weather radar, AAtS, satellite 
weather, and FIS-B. Onboard weather radar is capable of detecting significant 
convection and lightning strikes at 200 nm or more from the aircraft to provide an 
indication of the current weather in the forward direction of the aircraft. Satellite weather 
and FIS-B provide both provide NEXRAD reflectivity, which provides an indication of 
current weather conditions, and convective Significant Meteorological Information 
reports (SIGMETs), which provide forecasted convection.  
 Wind velocity and temperature – satellite weather, IFC, AAtS, and/or FIS-B. Updated 
wind field information in particular is key to effective trajectory optimization. 
 SAA status – available through FIS-B, AAtS, and/or IFC. Early release of SAA provides 
an opportunity for more direct routing. Although not called out in the TASAR ConOps, 
airspace-related NOTAMs (e.g., facility/equipment outages and volcanic ash) would also 
be available through the above-mentioned services. 
 Turbulence data – while identified in the TASAR ConOps, availability and quality of 
turbulence data needs to be improved before it can be used operationally for trajectory 
change requests. 
 ATC procedures – departure, arrival, and approach procedures defined on charts and 
available in the FMS navigation database. 
 Other ATC information such as sector boundaries – database of sector structure, letters 
of agreement (LOA) between ATC facilities, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
within a facility. Data rarely changes so updates are not required during flight. 
Consideration of these types of information in the proposed trajectory can improve ATC 
acceptability. Not currently available to pilots. 
 TMIs – the TASAR ConOps only identified a small subset of TMIs, but since TMIs are 
now part of TFMData, the full list of TMI-related information should be included (see 
Section 3.9). The relationship between TMIs and trajectory constraints varies – some 
TMIs translate directly into constraints (e.g., a weather reroute trajectory) others are 
fuzzy as to the eventual impact on a trajectory (e.g., MIT restrictions). ICAO (ICAO-
ATMRPP 2015) suggest minimizing TMI “trajectory constraints to the extent possible 
and to the tolerance level commensurate with the ATM function it serves, to avoid 
limiting airborne operations more than is strictly required. One could for example adhere 
to a target time within a defined tolerance level of ± 2 minutes for arrival at a metering 
fix, and simultaneously allow for fluctuations (within limits) in speed to keep the flight 
optimized in a varying atmosphere, or add lateral or vertical trajectory constraints 
triggered by the need for conflict resolution.”  
 Updated ATC Information – the FOC (primarily through the ATC Coordinator position) 
receives updated Traffic Flow Management (TFM) information through direct 
communication with an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) or Terminal Radar 
Control (TRACON) TMU that could influence trajectory change requests (e.g., reroute to 
a different arrival corner post, avoid certain sectors or airways).  
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 Fleet optimization information from the FOC – fleet optimization may override individual 
trajectory optimization. For example: 1) the FOC directs own-fleet sequencing of flights 
at the arrival fix to facilitate passenger connectivity; 2) the FOC informs the pilot about 
lack of gate availability at the destination airport to inhibit trajectory change requests for 
reduced flight time, particularly for airports with congested ramp areas. In proposing new 
trajectory change requests, these examples may cause the pilot to change the 
optimization objective and/or manually impose new constraints. 
4.1.1.1 Success stories 
4.1.1.1.1 Traffic Aware Planner 
The Traffic Aware Planner (TAP) is a cockpit decision support tool developed under TASAR. 
A modified version of NASA’s Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP) is installed on a portable 
EFB. A flight-test aircraft was modified to host the EFB, the TAP application, an ADS-B 
processor, and a satellite broadband datalink. Nine evaluation pilots conducted 26 hours of TAP 
assessments using four route profiles in the complex eastern and north-eastern US airspace. 
Twelve TAP-generated trajectory optimization requests were submitted to ATC, of which nine 
were approved, and all of which resulted in fuel and/or time savings. 
Of the information sources identified in the TASAR ConOps above, the trajectory change 
requests incorporated traffic information via ADS-B, SAA boundaries, and wind-field data 
derived from live broadband connectivity to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) Rapid Refresh system. Weather avoidance was not evaluated in the 
flight trials, and SAA boundaries were hard-coded into a database available to TAP and treated 
as “permanently hot” airspace. 
All program objectives were met, and the next phase of TAP development and evaluations 
with Alaska Airlines and Virgin American Airlines is underway (Maris et al. 2014). Recently, a 
TASAR roadmap was developed for evolutionary implementation of TASAR concept elements 
leveraging advances in NextGen (such as Data Comm) while minimizing repetitious investments 
by users in hardware and certification. Each roadmap step is supportable on its own merits, 
enabling the choice by each operator on how far to proceed on the roadmap. (Cotton et al. 
2016). 
4.1.1.2 Roadblocks to adopting pilot/FMS information needs  
 FMS database capacity (Herndon 2012): 
o Today’s navigation databases (depending on vendor) range from 6 MB to 8.2 
MB. There are several existing FMS models that store 2 MB or less. 
o Another FMS capacity issue is the number of waypoints available for processing. 
One widely used FMS model with ample navigation database capacity may store 
a maximum of 255 terminal waypoints for an individual airport. Some airports 
now exceed 300 waypoints.  
o One FMS model has a limit of 99 total procedures and a limit of 8 waypoints per 
procedure. 
o With the advent of Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures, the 
demand for increased navigation database memory capacity will continue.  
o Today, memory limitations require that some operators carefully customize their 
databases based on the individual needs of their operation. One example given 
is removing all holding patterns except those on missed approaches. 
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 While Section 4.1.1 identified ATC procedures as a type of information needed by the 
pilot/FMS, there are many ATC LOAs and SOPs that can change the FMS trajectory that 
are unknown to the pilot and are not available in an FMS database. Furthermore, 
trajectory changes due to these procedures often put the aircraft on an open trajectory 
(e.g., temporary altitudes – see Section 4.2). 
4.1.2 Flight Operations Center 
The FOC provides a wide range of capabilities for the air carrier: fleet management, 
dispatch, flight planning, ATC coordination, load planning, flight following, weather, 
maintenance, crew tracking, crew scheduling, passenger connectivity at hub stations, and 
understanding airport operations (IATA 2014). Most of the information needed for these 
capabilities is internal to the FOC. This section focuses on the information needed by the FOC 
from both the ANSP and the pilot to effectively manage their operations. 
Section 4.1.1 identified the needs of the pilot. All of the information needed by the pilot is 
also needed by the FOC so it is not repeated here, but the granularity or time horizon of the 
information may be different. For example, the FOC, usually through the ATC coordinator 
position, needs additional information about TMIs as it may impact fleet management strategies 
as noted in Mafera and Smith (2000): 
Need for causal information  
The ATC coordinator must be able to understand why changes in NAS constraints have 
occurred. Often it is a challenge for the airlines to interpret an action taken by ATC. 
When asked how he dealt with MIT restrictions, a dispatcher replied, “When I see a 
miles-in-trail restriction, it’s like a red flag … the first step is to figure out what is causing 
it.” ATC coordinators and dispatchers need to know the context in which ATC has 
undertaken a particular system-wide action. In other words, restrictions implemented by 
ATC must be clearly associated with an event. The explicit linking of traffic-flow 
restrictions with their associated event provides causal information (i.e., the underlying 
reason) about the restriction. The presence of causal information, created by clearly 
identifying and defining events, provides critical route planning information. Different 
types of events usually require airlines to apply different strategies for minimizing their 
impact. For example, weather-related events are dealt with differently than events that 
involve high traffic volume. Knowledge of the nature of the event allows the airlines to 
react more effectively to the changing constraints and make the appropriate adjustments 
for future flights. 
Currently, causal information is provided inconsistently. The FAA’s TMI Standardization 
Project is working to ensure the same causal information is consistent and available across all 
TFM tools (TSD, FSM, and NTML) (Shisler, Cunningham, et al. 2014). This project is also 
working to identify coupled TMIs. For example, linking a passback MIT restriction to the original 
TMI (e.g., another MIT restriction or TBFM metering). 
Mafera and Smith (2000) also notes that historical information about previous TMIs is useful: 
Need for historical information  
In order for ATC coordinators to infer ATC actions, there needs to be information 
available that will allow for the anticipation of constraint changes on the NAS. Access to 
a database of previous ATC actions would make it easier for ATC coordinators to 
anticipate constraint changes on the NAS. If this information were available, the ATC 
coordinator would be able to formulate a more comprehensive system outlook; the 
outlook may also include impending constraint changes on the NAS. This will enable 
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airlines to take the appropriate steps to minimize disruptions to service in advance of 
actual constraint changes. 
Note that only CDM FOCs have access to historical information currently through the TFMS 
thin client applications (see Section 3.7). 
4.1.2.1 Roadblocks to adopting the FOC’s role in NextGen 
In the Joint Planning and Development Office’s (JPDO’s) FOC report (JPDO 2012), the 
following shortcomings were identified regarding the FOC’s limited role in NextGen: 
Finding 4: The rules and content for data sharing are not clearly defined. While NextGen 
stresses the importance of “distributed decision making,” increased user focus, and 
provisioning information to users, the current NGIP [NextGen Implementation Plan] does 
not address the data availability, rules, and related processes that will be required to 
bring this to fruition. 
Finding 5: There is a lack of appreciation for and incorporation of the role of the FOC to 
ensure the success of the FAA Data Communications (DataComm) program. 
4.1.3 Controller 
The information needs of the pilot also apply to the controller to the extent that it supports 
the controller’s view of the world (around the sector vs. along the flight plan for the pilot). In 
addition, an ICAO flight plan filed by the pilot or dispatcher provides the following information to 
the controller: 
 Aircraft identification (Note: Aircraft identification means the radio call sign!) 
 Flight rules and type of flight 
 Number of aircraft, type(s) of aircraft and wake turbulence category 
 Equipment on board 
 Departure aerodrome ICAO code and planned time of departure 
 First cruising speed and first cruising level or altitude 
 Lateral route to be followed 
 Destination aerodrome ICAO code and total estimated elapsed time (EET) 
 Alternate aerodrome(s) 
 Remarks and other equipment (emergency and survival) 
 Fuel endurance and total number of persons on board 
Equipment codes describe the communication, navigation, approach aids and surveillance 
transponder equipment on board an aircraft. Equipment is a key piece of information because it 
determines aircraft capabilities and the procedures the controller must use to accommodate 
those capabilities. In the mixed equipage environment of Data Comm and ADS-B, it will become 
even more important. 
Controller and pilot views of the weather can be different. The controller can trust the pilot to 
maneuver as necessary, but this puts the aircraft on an open trajectory. 
While the flight plan accurately portrays the lateral profile of the flight, the vertical profile is 
ambiguous to the controller so large buffers are used for separation. If FMS trajectory prediction 
for TOC and TOD were able to be provided to the controller, this would address some of the 
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ambiguity. The remainder of the ambiguity is a result of the differences in trajectory prediction 
between the FMS and ERAM, which is discussed in Section 4.3.5. 
4.1.4 Traffic managers 
The pilot and controller information needs also apply to traffic managers so it is not repeated 
here. However, the time horizon of traffic managers (and TFMS) is much larger than that of 
controllers and pilots. Filing flight plans as early as possible (preferably the day before) provides 
the ANSP with an accurate picture of expected demand and can help lessen delays that arise 
as a result of constraints in the NAS. 
Flight planning services that are CDM participants have a direct connection to TFMS – flight 
plans filed through them go immediately into TFMS as early intent messages. This ensures that 
a flight will be considered known demand if any TMIs are issued. Then, usually a few hours 
before the flight, the actual flight plan is filed, detailing the route and other specifics.  
When the ATCSCC implements a TMI, it models the initiative based on the available traffic 
information present in TFMS. When a flight plan is in TFMS during the planning process for the 
TMI, the flight is considered known demand and is accounted for in TFMS planning. 
If a flight plan is not in TFMS due to late filing, any modeled TMIs will be based on 
incomplete information and will not accurately and efficiently address the imbalance that TFMS 
is trying to solve. The most restrictive TMIs tend to occur when TFMS suddenly has too much 
demand for a given area or airport within the NAS, without adequate time to proactively plan for 
it. Late filers will likely receive additional delay as a result. These additional delays can be 
significant, many times resulting in the maximum delay for the TMI, which can be hundreds of 
minutes. 
4.2 Closed trajectories and closed trajectory clearances 
A closed trajectory refers to ANSP automation, FMS, and FOC automation all having a 
common, shared view of the aircraft’s intended trajectory. Closed trajectories enable accurate 
evaluation of the paths of multiple aircraft at points ahead of the respective aircraft for the 
purpose of conflict detection and flow management (JPDO 2011a), thereby reducing the need 
for downstream controller intervention. A closed trajectory clearance is any controller-issued 
clearance that ensures the updated trajectory is closed (e.g., an OPD or a route amendment). 
One of the objectives of MBT is to utilize closed trajectory clearances in the lateral, vertical, and 
temporal dimensions as much as possible to improve trajectory predictability and overall NAS 
predictability. 
In contrast, an open trajectory refers to aircraft no longer flying a shared view between the 
aircraft and ground automation. If the aircraft is flying based on selected heading, speed, or 
altitude in the mode control panel, then this typically represents an open trajectory because it is 
overriding the FMS trajectory. 
An open trajectory can be identified in ERAM in two ways: 
1) The controller enters the temporary trajectory change information into ERAM at the 
same time as the controller gives the instruction to the pilot – for example, heading 
(lateral dimension), temporary altitude (vertical dimension), temporary speed (temporal 
dimension), and hold with expected time duration (temporal dimension) can all be 
entered into ERAM quickly. The ERAM display indicates these are temporary changes in 
the flight data block, which serves as a reminder to the controller and facilitates handoff 
coordination with the next sector. 
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2) If the controller does not enter information per #1, then ERAM will eventually identify that 
the aircraft is out of the conformance bounds of the predicted trajectory. 
In either case, identification of an open trajectory in ERAM triggers logic to rebuild the 
trajectory, which is dependent on the dimension. For example, in the lateral dimension, it does 
this by returning the aircraft to some waypoint in the planned route of flight (where the waypoint 
selected is based on assumptions about controller’s intent – e.g., the controller would not send 
an aircraft back to a waypoint it has already passed). In the vertical dimension, ERAM continues 
to use the intended altitude. The main issue with temporary trajectory changes is not knowing 
when the aircraft will return to the intended trajectory – it could be 30 seconds, or it could be 
several minutes. Open trajectories are known issues for ERAM, particularly with regards to 
conflict probe performance (Mondoloni et al. 2016).  
Unlike ERAM, TFMS does not have access to controller entries for temporary trajectory 
changes so conformance monitoring is the only way to identify an open trajectory. Like ERAM, 
there is logic to rebuild a trajectory when out of conformance. In addition, TFMS has special 
consideration for the temporal dimension since it must also perform trajectory prediction for pre-
departure aircraft. If an aircraft has not departed within 5 minutes of the departure time, the 
departure time used in the trajectory prediction is set to the current time and the time counter 
gets reset. This logic assumes the aircraft will eventually depart, which ensures that the 
trajectory is accounted for in demand predictions. If the flight still has not departed after 90 
minutes and there is no explicit action to update the departure time, the flight is cancelled from 
the perspective of TFMS trajectory predictions. 
When MIT restrictions are in effect in the NAS, currently TFMS does not account for those 
restriction in any of its logic. It does not try to estimate a delay for individual flights or the flights 
in aggregate, meaning that estimated demand on downstream sectors or airports will be 
inaccurate until each affected aircraft has met the MIT restriction and is back on its intended 
trajectory. 
Another situation that causes temporally open trajectories in TFMS (but much less 
frequently than MIT) is when a flight is awaiting departure, but the flight is constrained by a call 
for release (e.g., no space in the overhead stream) (note: this applies to situations where TBFM 
is not managing internal departures). If the traffic management coordinator (TMC) knows a 
particular flight will be on the ground for, say, at least an extra 15 minutes, the TMC generally 
does not update the departure time. Some temporal uncertainty would be removed if they did 
update the departure time instead of relying on the 5 min reset logic. This is in contrast to TMIs 
such as GDPs and AFPs, where required departure delays are captured through the Expect 
Departure Clearance Time (EDCT) parameter and are incorporated into the TFMS trajectory 
predictions. 
4.2.1 Closed trajectory clearances issued by voice communication 
The near-term MBT concept must handle a mixed equipage environment where some 
aircraft will not have Data Comm, but would expect to receive some level of MBT services. This 
section identifies the types of closed trajectory clearances that can be issued by voice that could 
be available to support near-term MBT. In the en route cruise environment, the most common 
closed trajectory clearance issued by voice is the direct-to clearance where one or more 
waypoints in the flight plan are skipped and the aircraft flies direct to the waypoint stated in the 
clearance.  
Other commonly used closed trajectory clearances are standard terminal arrival routes 
(STARs), standard instrument departure (SIDs), and instrument approach procedures (IAPs). 
Collectively, these procedures identify both the lateral and vertical profile, which can be stored 
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in the FMS navigation database. When a controller clears a pilot to fly any of these types of 
procedures, it is understood that the aircraft follows both the lateral and vertical path without any 
additional instruction. For example, “Descend via [STAR name].” If the controller wants only a 
portion of the procedure to be followed an exception is used. For example, “Descend via [STAR 
name] except maintain [altitude]” requires the pilot to level off at the specified altitude unless 
additional instruction is provided later. 
While TBFM includes the vertical window constraints associated with these procedures in its 
trajectory prediction, ERAM currently does not. However, there are plans to include them when 
ERAM incorporates Kinetic Vertical Modeling in the trajectory prediction (Young, Faith, and 
Schnitzer 2016). 
4.2.1.1 Success stories 
4.2.1.1.1 Efficient Descent Advisor (Coppenbarger et al. 2010) 
NASA’s EDA is a trajectory-based tool for en route air traffic controllers that computes OPD 
solutions designed to minimize aircraft fuel consumption and associated carbon dioxide 
emissions while maximizing airspace throughput. EDA advisories are designed to facilitate 
clearance delivery by voice using standard FAA phraseology and procedures. If the EDA 
advisory is airspeed only, there are two airspeed components – one for the cruise segment 
through the TOD and another for the descent segment. For advisories that include path 
stretching, the controller first issues EDA airspeed clearances to the flight deck followed by 
saying “advised routing when ready to copy,” which prepares pilots for receiving the subsequent 
path stretch clearance. 
The path stretch maneuver, if needed, uses auxiliary waypoints defined with the 
fix/radial/distance FRD naming convention: NAMEDFIXxxxyyy where xxx = 3-digit radial (deg) 
and yyy = 3 digit distance (nm) (note: these are also called degree distance fixes). For example, 
AMWAY125051 means an auxiliary waypoint relative to named waypoint AMWAY on a radial of 
125 degrees and 51 nm distance as depicted in Figure 5. Once received on the flight deck, 
pilots enter the EDA clearances directly into their FMS (Coppenbarger et al. 2010). 
Example EDA Advisory: 
 M70/250K 
 @LBF..AMWAY125@051..AMWAY TELLR1 PROFILE 
Corresponding ATC voice clearance: 
 “United 123, EDA clearance, maintain Mach point seven slant 250 knots, revised routing 
when ready to copy”  
 “United 123, at North Platte, proceed direct to the AMWAY one two five at zero five one, 
then direct AMWAY, descend via the TELLR1 profile” (where LBF is the North Platte 
VORTAC)” 
35 
 
Figure 5. Example EDA path stretch advisory (Coppenbarger et al. 2010) 
Maneuver execution delay is the period of time between the issuing of a trajectory clearance 
by a controller and the actual execution of that clearance by the aircraft (McNally et al. 2010). 
Maneuver execution delay for voice clearances that involve only a change in mode control panel 
(MCP) settings are small, but it can be larger if the voice clearance requires changing the route 
in the FMS. The EDA voice clearance described above ensures the maneuver execution delay 
is zero with regards to the path stretch maneuver. The aircraft receives the clearance well 
before it reaches North Platte (LBF), which is the start of the path stretch as indicated by “United 
123, at North Platte, proceed direct to …” This formulation of the clearance provides sufficient 
time for the pilot to make the change in the FMS prior to the start of the path stretch ensuring 
that the trajectory prediction and actual trajectory are in close agreement. 
4.2.1.2 Other types of closed trajectory voice clearances 
4.2.1.2.1 Parallel-offset routes 
A parallel-offset route is a parallel track to the left or right of the designated airway or route 
(see Figure 6). Such routes are normally associated with RNAV operations and entered into the 
FMS with just a few button pushes. Parallel-offset routes are a method for creating ad hoc 
routes that can be easily communicated by voice from controller to pilot and have been used for 
over a decade by controllers. The parallel offset can be used as a resolution to conflicts (e.g., 
overtaking slower aircraft or climbing through a stream of traffic to reach a higher flight level). 
When supported by ANSP automation,23 offset routes are closed trajectories that are 
theoretically easy to specify to a pilot via voice communication, as only a turn-out angle, an 
offset distance, and a return waypoint are required (Lauderdale, Santiago, and Pankok 2010). 
Offsets are not currently modeled in ERAM. 
                                                 
23 In ERAM, creation of a parallel offset maneuver is currently not supported, but a controller could quickly develop 
a parallel-offset route (or path stretch for that matter) by “route clicking” to insert waypoints that approximate the 
path of the parallel-offset and then send this as a route amendment to ERAM, thus maintaining the closed trajectory. 
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Figure 6. Parallel offset route from (Lauderdale, Santiago, and Pankok 2010) 
 
4.2.1.2.2 New approach for full-route clearances by voice: Coded Airborne Reroutes? 
This section discusses a concept that has not been pursued by the FAA to date. It is 
included here as a potential method for allowing aircraft not equipped with Data Comm to 
receive MBT services via voice communication. As background, pre-coordinated/published 
Coded Departure Routes (CDRs) allow controllers to instantaneously issue a reroute 
(containing a long route string) to a pilot prior to departure using an abbreviated clearance. The 
computer entry is abbreviated so that the controller does not have to type in a long sequence of 
route components and the pilot can have these routes pre-stored in their FMS. This procedure 
significantly improved ground movement at many airports during thunderstorm events by 
expediting the flows and allowing controllers to issue the best available route right up until 
“cleared for takeoff”. 
CDRs are based on airport-pairs, but it could be extended to airborne flights by leveraging 
other existing categories of routes such as: 
 Navigation Reference System (NRS) Wind Routes are pre-coordinated and published 
ATCSCC advisories, but are not available to issue in an abbreviated form. 
 National Playbook Routes are pre-coordinated and published ATCSCC advisories, but 
are not available to issue in an abbreviated form. 
 National Q-Routes are pre-coordinated and published and are available to issue in an 
abbreviated form (typically have 5-10 on-ramp/off-ramp points). 
Coded Airborne Reroutes (CARs) would allow controllers to use abbreviated clearances to 
expeditiously reroute airborne aircraft, leveraging the technology, procedural, and flexibility 
advantages that already exist with pre-coordinated/published CDRs, Playbooks, NRS Wind 
Routes, and Q-Routes (Kaler 2011). 
4.2.2 Closed trajectory clearances using automation and Data Comm 
Data Comm enables complex, closed trajectory clearances and is viewed as one of the key 
enablers for MBT going forward from today’s capabilities.  
4.2.2.1 Success stories 
A comprehensive simulation study in 2010 utilized NASA’s suite of strategic and tactical 
tools for conflict resolution and efficient descents (via EDA) integrated with simulated Data 
Comm capabilities. These tools offered five types of closed resolution trajectories (path stretch, 
direct-to, offset, altitude, speed) for each aircraft in a detected conflict pair. The simulation 
utilized 102 hours of actual Fort Worth Center traffic recordings from 32 separate 3-hour and 4-
hour samples from busy weekday periods on 30 different days in 2010. In total, the analysis is 
based on 37,631 individual flights.  
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Results clearly demonstrate under a wide variety of traffic conditions that 4D trajectory 
automation can provide minimum-delay solutions to traffic conflicts, identify time/fuel-efficient 
flight trajectories, and substantially reduce the number of clearances compared to today’s 
operations. Figure 7 shows the comparison between the flight plan amendments implemented in 
the simulation (top) vs. the actual flight plan amendments issued on May 13, 2010 (bottom). The 
very high number of temporary altitude clearances by the ZFW controllers in the field indicates a 
conservative strategy when dealing with the uncertainty in transition airspace. Nonetheless, the 
results support the hypothesis that closed trajectories improve predictability and reduce the 
need for controller intervention (McNally et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of actual Host with simulation flight plan amendments for common 
traffic sample (McNally et al. 2010). 
In 2012, NASA’s Airspace Operations Lab conducted a human in the loop study (HITL) to 
investigate the effects of varying levels of controller automation and Data Comm equipage 
(which enables complex, closed trajectory clearances) on controller acceptability and workload. 
Scenarios for four equipage levels were developed. The fourth level is omitted below because it 
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was a fully autonomous scenario and out of scope for MBT. The first three stages are described 
below: 
The first stage, “Current Day”, was designed to provide data approximating current day 
operations with the addition of ADS-B out surveillance data. The traffic levels were 
selected to be representative of current day peak traffic levels with a Monitor Alert 
Parameter (MAP) value of 18 aircraft per sector. 
The second stage, labeled “Minimum NextGen”, introduced limited data communication 
between the groundside and 25% of the simulated aircraft. This data communication 
enabled an automatic transfer of communication of aircraft from one sector to the next. 
This eased the controller workload in handling those aircraft. … This stage also 
introduced more decision support capabilities for the controllers, none of which were 
integrated with data comm. So, all control instructions still had to be communicated via 
voice. It was hoped that the new technologies could enable a capacity increase of 20%, 
and the MAP value was set to 22 aircraft per sector for the “Minimum NextGen”.  
In the third stage, entitled “Moderate NextGen”, the controller planning tools and the 
flight management systems on-board the aircraft were integrated with data comm., and 
50% of the aircraft were assumed data comm equipped. Controllers were able to issue 
trajectory change instructions to equipped aircraft via data comm. Based upon earlier 
research, it was hypothesized that this environment could enable a capacity increase of 
50% over the Baseline and therefore the MAP value was set to 27 for this stage. (Prevot 
et al. 2014) 
Results indicated that although the aircraft count increased by 20% and 50%, respectively, 
for the Minimum and Moderate NextGen conditions (with respect to Current Day), controller 
workload stayed constant across all three conditions. Controller acceptability improved slightly 
under the Minimum condition compared to Current Day, but dropped significantly under the 
Moderate NextGen condition because two participants rated the operations as “unsafe” due to 
not being alerted to conflicts (Wing et al. 2013). This indicates that simply adding automated 
functions for conflict resolution advisories without changing the operational paradigm may be 
problematic (Prevot et al. 2014). 
4.2.3 Roadblocks to adopting closed trajectories 
Appendix 1 of the En Route traffic Soft Management Ultimate System (ERASMUS) Concept 
of Operations (European Commission 2007) states: 
Risk is linked to uncertainty which in turn causes the controller to doubt. Managing doubt 
is a very resource intensive activity – it consumes cognitive resources and represents 
one of the main draws on the mental economy. Because of the uncertainty inherent in 
the system, the controller’s expert judgment is not always able to immediately categorize 
traffic situations as “conflict” or “no conflict”. Some doubts can remain with regard to any 
particular perceived conflict. In this case, the controller can let the situation develop in 
order to refine their assessment and defer making a decision to intervene only when 
they are certain it is justified. 
In other words, trajectory uncertainty causes controllers to use tactical clearances, which 
tend to be open trajectory clearances. Consider that automated conflict resolution advisories 
have been discussed for over two decades and still have not been implemented in ERAM.24 
Without the automation support for closed trajectories, controllers will continue to use open 
trajectory techniques. 
                                                 
24 https://www.caasd.org/library/papers/uret/ 
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The following examples result in open trajectories because the ANSP and FMS automation 
do not have intent information about when aircraft will return to their intended trajectories. 
 Conflict resolution strategies such as leveling aircraft off during climb or descent, 
vectoring, altitude changes, or speed changes. 
 Vectoring and/or speed changes to meet MIT restrictions. 
 Vectoring or altitude changes to bypass or climb above weather. 
 SOPs and LOAs not accounted for in navigation databases (and thus not in the FMS) 
that specify crossing restrictions that require aircraft to level off and/or change speed. 
Lastly, historical procedures remain entrenched in aviation culture and automation: 
As a consequence, remaining at the cleared en-route altitude was seen as essential for 
safety and aircraft were not allowed to alter their altitude without explicit clearance. This 
explicit requirement for clearance to change altitude from the late 1920s is hard coded 
into ATM systems and Flight Management Computers to this day …(Wilson and Sipe 
2016) 
While aircraft can implicitly change direction when transitioning between lateral waypoints, 
aircraft cannot change altitude when encountering a vertical waypoint without an explicit 
clearance (except when allowed by specific departure, arrival, and approach procedures). This 
inhibits implicit altitude changes in the FMS that may be desired by the pilot and FOC such as 
efficient step-climbs as fuel is burned, improved flight efficiency due to altitude-related wind 
gradients, or avoiding turbulence by including planned altitude changes. 
4.2.4 Negative impacts of roadblock 
Open trajectory clearances exacerbate the trajectory uncertainty in the system. On the other 
hand, trajectory predictability enables controllers to use strategic, closed trajectory clearances, 
which then maintains a high level of trajectory predictability. Thus, one negative impact is not 
knowing what set of technologies, procedures, and cultural changes will be the tipping point that 
moves the NAS towards wide-spread use of closed trajectories and predictability to facilitate 
MBT. There is clearly cultural resistance to automated conflict resolution advisories. 
4.3 Trajectory negotiation 
The current system is not very conducive to trajectory negotiation. There are two main 
reasons for this: 1) voice communication of complex reroutes is impractical for widespread use 
in the NAS; and 2) the pilot or FOC negotiating the trajectory does not have complete visibility 
into static (e.g., SOPs and LOAs) and real-time ANSP constraints. Some users have gone to 
great length to incorporate unpublished ANSP constraints into their flight planning automation: 
… an informal interview was conducted with a dispatch operator from the United Parcel 
Service (UPS). UPS uses a dispatch support tool called Lido Flight Planning Services, 
which considers all valid aeronautical restrictions (e.g. NOTAMs or “Notice to Airmen”, 
restricted airspaces, weather minima, etc.) in creating flight plans that are optimized for 
various factors such as winds …  
… UPS decided to stop using these more direct routes, and worked closely with the ATC 
facilities to understand what procedures, both official and unofficial, could be 
expected and planned. UPS found that for their operations, it was most efficient to file 
their flights in line with what the ATCs were least likely to cancel. This knowledge base is 
very valuable to UPS since it is now also a part of their Lido system. For example, any 
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procedure, e.g., “always expect ‘FL290’ as early as ZOB when going to any airport in 
ZNY” and “we typically prefer arrival procedure ‘XYZ’ during our morning rush” was 
documented and integrated into the Lido system as “fixed route” objects. With all this 
information integrated into the Lido system, UPS dispatch operators can create a flight 
plan by checking for any fixed-routes for a given city-pair, and can file the most optimal 
routing. If no fixed route constraints exist, then flight plans are optimized for winds. Due 
to the nature of traffic patterns in the NAS, flights in the Northeast corridor mainly use 
flight plans based on fixed-route constraints, whereas flights in the western part of the 
country typically use more wind-optimal routing (Lee et al. 2008). [Note: bold text added 
for emphasis] 
One-off approaches like the one UPS has undertaken, while industrious, should not be the 
norm for users in the NAS. 
Trajectory negotiation is used in oceanic operations through the Dynamic Airborne Reroute 
Procedure (DARP), but it is coordination-intensive and time-consuming: 
Inadequate inter-FIR [flight information region] coordination also is a significant barrier to 
trajectory modification. Oceanic reroutes often traverse multiple FIRs. En route trajectory 
amendments in oceanic airspace are governed by the Dynamic Airborne Reroute 
Procedure (DARP). While DARP allows en route trajectory amendments, the procedure 
is time-consuming, requiring the dispatcher to coordinate with the FIR where the aircraft 
is currently operating and all downstream FIRs, possibly by e-mail, before the flight crew 
can request the route amendment. New York and Oakland Oceanic have developed 
procedures for coordinating with their international counterparts for some common 
routes and continue to work to improve the implementation of the procedure, but the 
significant amount of coordination required makes the procedure time consuming. 
(Fernandes, Rebollo, and Koch 2016) 
The authors of this report were authors of the NextGen Trajectory Negotiation (NTN) 
ConOps (Hatton 2014). Some key points from NTN ConOps are listed below: 
Problem Statement: The route amendment process in today’s system includes a 
number of manual steps that can be slow, cumbersome, and require involvement of 
actors that may not have access to the best information to determine the most 
appropriate amendment. As a result, it can be difficult for the NAS to respond to events 
in a dynamic and timely fashion. There are missed opportunities when flight operators 
that desire a different trajectory are not able to negotiate it. Today’s system is not agile 
enough to consistently orchestrate user-preferred trajectories for all flights. 
Concept Overview: NTN is a process by which the ANSP and flight operator negotiate 
trajectories that meet NAS constraints and flight operator objectives. Trajectory 
information is exchanged digitally among ATC, TMU, FOC (for aircraft supported by an 
FOC), and equipped aircraft (by voice for non-equipped aircraft) to ensure accurate and 
complete information is shared, resulting in more efficient negotiations. 
The specific actors required to participate in a negotiation may vary by situation. Actors’ 
level of participation, procedures, and capabilities needed for trajectory negotiation 
depend on: 
 Aircraft phase of flight during the negotiation 
 Time/distance until the aircraft reaches the expected Trajectory Change Point (TCP) 
 Actor initiating the negotiation (controller, flight crew, traffic manager, or FOC) 
 Reason for the negotiation 
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 The number of aircraft and flight category (e.g., same destination airport, within same 
fleet, shared route, and shared downstream sector) needing negotiated trajectories and 
consideration of any resulting demand/capacity imbalances 
 Whether the aircraft is supported by an FOC, flight planning service, or has no ground 
support  
 Aircraft equipment (e.g., digital data exchange, trajectory planning and evaluation 
capabilities)  
Some other key concept elements of NTN are: 
1. The TMC can implement a negotiated trajectory directly without involving the controller 
currently responsible for the aircraft, assuming the first trajectory change point is 
sufficiently downstream of the controller’s time horizon. This would be useful in situations 
where the current controller is too busy with events such as weather and/or the TMC is 
acting on behalf of many flights simultaneously that must all avoid a downstream 
constraint where a coordinated reroute plan is required. 
2. While negotiating a specific trajectory is still an option, this lacks flexibility since the 
exact time duration of the negotiation process is uncertain. For example, the aircraft may 
pass the first trajectory change point before the trajectory is accepted by the ANSP, 
thereby invalidating the trajectory. Or the negotiation occurs very quickly but the aircraft 
must now wait 5 minutes for the first trajectory point, decreasing efficiency. To provide 
flexibility in the presence of negotiation duration uncertainty, the NTN ConOps proposed 
the notion of negotiating based on goals and constraints as depicted in Figure 8. In this 
example, the goal is to turn north as soon as possible via multiple options depending on 
the negotiation duration. The constraint is to reconnect with the route as it skirts the 
weather.  
 
Figure 8. Trajectory negotiation by goal and constraint (Hatton 2014). 
One question not explored by the NTN ConOps is how to equitably negotiate trajectories 
when multiple flights from multiple air carriers are involved. Park and Menon (2017) propose 
applying Bargaining Theory where the trajectory negotiation mechanism is formulated as an n-
player, finite strategy game. 
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The objective of each aircraft in the game is to minimize its cost of deviating from its 
desired trajectory, while the objective of the controller is provide clearances that ensure 
fairness while preventing conflicts. In order to avoid the need to share competition 
sensitive business logic employed by individual aircraft, the utility function is formulated 
in terms of the percentage cast deviation for each aircraft…The feasibility and the 
performance of the proposed game-theoretic trajectory-negotiation mechanism are 
demonstrated in a merging arrival traffic situation. 
4.3.1 Success stories 
 The TASAR/TAP capability described in Section 4.1.1.1.1. 
4.3.2 Enablers 
 Data Comm is the key enabler. Others include AID, EFB, AAtS, IFC, and ADS-B In. 
 The NTN concept for the TMC uplinking the negotiated trajectory, bypassing the 
controller, would require a TMC/pilot datalink capability. 
4.3.3 Roadblocks to adopting trajectory negotiation 
FMS capabilities do not support proposing a new trajectory, only to propose a flight-optimal 
way to achieve the given flight plan. EFB applications to support trajectory negotiation do not 
currently exist. While these applications will likely get developed when sufficient enablers are in 
place, the air carrier industry lack of interest in applications to leverage CTOP (which provide 
similar types of benefits as trajectory negotiation) is a cautionary tale for trajectory negotiation 
participation.   
4.3.4 Negative impacts of roadblock 
Trajectory negotiation is one of the MBT benefits that allows users to see direct, tangible 
benefits across the fleet or for individual flights. If users choose not to upgrade their capabilities 
to facilitate trajectory negotiation, it is an indicator that they would not likely upgrade for other 
aspects of MBT. 
4.3.5 Specific implications for MBT 
It will be difficult to make realistic estimates of user participation for trajectory negotiation, 
which will have a direct bearing on benefits. 
4.4 Managing residual trajectory uncertainty 
“A 'predicted trajectory' represents the path that an aircraft is expected to follow from its 
current position onwards.” (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
Traditionally, ATM systems have attempted to predict an aircraft’s trajectory independent of 
the control system that is planning that trajectory and issuing control instructions. In automatic 
control theory, this is an open-loop system with an external observer. For example, a controller 
wants to merge two aircraft that will land on a runway. The controller notionally constructs a 
planned trajectory in his/her head, and then issues speed and heading commands to the 
aircraft. As the aircraft proceed, the controller’s envisioned trajectory may change, and the 
controller will issue new commands reflecting the current state of the aircraft. Separately, an 
automation system is trying to predict the aircrafts’ trajectories without knowing the planned 
trajectory (which only exists in the controller’s head and may contain very little detail) or the 
commands issued to the aircraft. In this type of traditional ATM system, the trajectory prediction 
problem became one of making intelligent guesses based on generic knowledge about typical 
controller procedures and aircraft characteristics. Although the automation may be fine-tuned to 
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produce prediction errors that have a zero average error over many flights, for any specific 
flight, the trajectory prediction errors may be very large. 
TBO introduces a closed-loop control model in which a detailed (rather than approximate) 
trajectory is planned (and captured in an electronic form, rather than residing only in a 
controller’s head) and then the controller, pilot, and aircraft collectively attempt to control the 
aircraft to follow that planned trajectory, with a goal of minimizing error relative to the planned 
trajectory. The predicted trajectory is the planned trajectory, and the prediction becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Furthermore, the TBO concept generally involves aircraft being flown via 
FMS which is more accurate at following a target trajectory than a pilot manually flying the 
aircraft or a pilot manipulating autopilot inputs via the mode control panel. 
Trajectory prediction uncertainty behaves considerably differently in a closed-loop system 
than it does in an open-loop system. In an open-loop system, the uncertainty increases 
monotonically with increasing prediction horizon since the future is unbounded. In a closed-loop 
system, the uncertainty depends on the constraints that are part of the 4D trajectory. 
TBO concepts also include methods for trajectory synchronization (Torres, Martin, Klooster, 
and Ren 2011), which includes communicating trajectory assignments and constraints to all 
interested parties, sharing information such as wind data so that trajectory predictions can be 
based on common information (Mondoloni et al. 2016), and sharing the aircraft’s FMS-
calculated trajectory prediction with other systems via various datalink protocols (Konyak et al. 
2008). Trajectory synchronization helps reduce trajectory prediction errors by enabling each 
prediction to utilize the best information possible. 
While describing TBO, the ICAO TBO Concept (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) describes residual 
uncertainty or residual unpredictability as follows:  
With improved data communications for synchronizing information and its updates 
amongst the various operational actors and systems, and with the introduction of 
improved performance based navigation, the level of uncertainty is reduced 
substantially. However, the ATM network will never become fully deterministic; some 
level of inherent unpredictability will remain. 
Residual uncertainty is the trajectory prediction uncertainty that will continue to exist after 
implementing TBO. Furthermore, because of the residual uncertainty the planned trajectories 
will need to be continuously refined during both pre-departure and flight execution time frames 
to incorporate the latest data to achieve system objectives: 
“Increasing performance of the overall system [through TBO] is therefore not simply a matter 
of freezing a plan and ensuring that all aircraft follow that plan. It requires planned 
trajectories to be continuously refined and revised during the execution phase, based on 
latest data, observations and predictions…” (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
This section discusses the causes and impacts of residual uncertainty. 
4.4.1 Sources of Trajectory Uncertainty 
4.4.1.1 Predictable vs. Unpredictable Uncertainty 
Trajectory uncertainty describes the possible error between the predicted trajectory and the 
trajectory that will actually be flown. One way to decompose trajectory uncertainty is by 
considering the “expected error” and the “unexpected error.” The expected error is error that you 
know will exist and can describe in some mathematical sense. For example, you can write a 
model for how much the aircraft will deviate from the assigned trajectory due to flight navigation 
error. The unexpected error is the error from unpredictable events - events that may occur (and 
may even been expected to occur) but for which there is insufficient knowledge to describe their 
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occurrence in any useful way. For example, an aircraft may have an emergency and need to 
descend rapidly. Before this happens, the aircraft has an assigned trajectory and a predicted 
trajectory. There exists some uncertainty in the predicted trajectory that, at any moment, the 
aircraft might deviate dramatically from the predicted trajectory. However, there is no utility in 
trying to model this very low probability of the aircraft doing one of a very large number of 
possible deviations. Therefore, while the uncertainty exists, it is not included in models of the 
trajectory uncertainty. 
Unpredictable events do not have to have a low probability of occurring. Another example of 
an unpredictable event that creates trajectory uncertainty is the need to re-plan the assigned 
trajectory. It is known that the assigned trajectory likely will be adjusted, either significantly to 
avoid a region of weather or congestion, or simply to add an RTA at a point along the assigned 
path. However, it is not known in advance when or how the trajectory will be adjusted. 
Therefore, there is trajectory uncertainty resulting from the possibility of future assigned 
trajectory changes, and the probability of this happening is not low, but we may not be able to 
model the uncertainty in a useful way. Sometimes an event could fall into either category 
depending on how much information is available about the event. 
4.4.1.2 Trajectory Prediction Errors 
Trajectory prediction errors contribute to residual uncertainty. Whether the trajectory is 
predicted by the FMS or ground-based automation systems, the models of future aircraft motion 
depend on wind data; the actual winds may differ from the forecast winds. Wind errors result in 
along-track trajectory prediction errors. Similarly, other data that affect the aircraft’s trajectory 
(e.g., aircraft weight) may not be known accurately (Mondoloni et al. 2016). Weight is not known 
when the trajectory is initially planned prior to departure. Casado, Vilaplana, and Goodchild 
(2013) discusses how trajectory prediction accuracy is affected by errors in aircraft performance 
data. Wickramasinghe et al. (2016) compares actual flight data with modeled data to understand 
the characteristics of modeling data errors, concluding that actual aircraft mass values vary 
substantially and have a large effect on trajectory prediction accuracy. 
4.4.1.3 Weather Forecast Errors 
Because of wind and temperature forecast errors, or unpredictable weather events such 
as gusts, ground and airborne [trajectory] predictions are subject to deviations… 
Particularly for medium and long haul flights the longer time-horizon requires updates of 
meteorological information during flight execution to reduce the difference between 
weather forecast and reality. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
Most TBO concepts include that weather forecasts will be shared as part of trajectory 
synchronization. However, weather forecast errors will remain a source of trajectory uncertainty. 
The trajectory actually flown is sensitive to wind and air temperature. If the trajectory is 
predicted using wind and temperature data different from what is actually experienced, the 
trajectory prediction will include errors. 
Weather forecasts also affect regions of airspace that are avoided due to expected 
hazardous conditions. Errors in weather forecasts will result in trajectory changes either to avoid 
or use airspace for which the forecast was wrong. Anything that causes trajectories to change 
represents a source of residual uncertainty – the initial trajectory prediction did not turn out to be 
correct. 
Turbulence is not currently forecast well, such that pilots often request altitude changes and 
even route changes to avoid regions of poor ride quality. This source of trajectory changes will 
persist in TBO concepts. 
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4.4.1.4 Capacity Forecast Errors 
Often due to weather forecast errors, capacity of constrained resources will also remain 
uncertain under TBO concepts; the actual capacity may be either larger or smaller than what 
was forecast. Trajectories may change as the actual capacity for a period of time becomes more 
certain as that period of time gets closer to the present time. 
Furthermore, TBO will not (at least initially) change how TFM is performed. While demand 
uncertainty will be reduced, remaining uncertainty in demand and uncertainty in capacity 
motivate TFM strategies that “hedge” by applying some of the delay that is expected to be 
required but waiting to apply all of the expected-to-be-required delay, in case it is not required. 
The assigned trajectories should be designed to apply some pressure to the capacity-
constrained resource so that if the actual capacity is larger than the forecast, capacity is not 
wasted and delays are minimized. However, if the actual capacity is as forecast, or less than 
forecast, then assigned trajectories will need to be modified. This TFM process of absorbing 
some of the necessary forecast delay at longer time horizons while leaving some necessary 
forecast delay until later, in case it is not required, must continue to operate in MBT. Therefore, 
residual uncertainty exists because the assigned trajectories are expected to be modified for 
TFM reasons for many flights.  
If TBFM continues to operate in the current method of allowing a flight’s STA to vary based 
on the varying ETAs of all of the flights being scheduled, until the flight crosses a freeze horizon, 
then this varying STA is a source of trajectory uncertainty while the flight is outside of the freeze 
horizon. 
4.4.1.5 Trajectory Flexibility 
Trajectory flexibility can be a source of residual uncertainty. Currently, when an aircraft is 
flying through a region with sparse convective weather, the pilot often uses some flexibility to 
avoid convective cells, using the aircraft’s weather radar. In this situation, planning a precise 
trajectory could be problematic, even over a shorter time horizon. Instead, the assigned 
trajectory needs to provide flexibility to allow piloting without violation of the assigned trajectory. 
However, in this case, the FMS is not flying the aircraft and does not know the pilot’s intentions; 
the intent information from the FMS will not be overly helpful. Residual uncertainty could be 
elevated in such situations, as even if the lateral and vertical path is within a defined distance of 
the assigned path, the timing of the aircraft along that path, or the timing of the aircraft at the 
exit point from that airspace region, will not be known accurately.  
Another source for assigned trajectory changes is the flight operator whose business 
considerations may change and who may initiate a trajectory negotiation to modify the assigned 
trajectory. 
Pilots are accustomed to negotiating altitude changes "just in time". Implementing a 4DT 
that includes pre-cleared altitude changes will be a major culture shift since pilots do not always 
know what altitude they actually want ahead of time (Fernandes, Rebollo, and Koch 2016).  
4.4.1.6 Departure Delay 
Prior to takeoff, one of the largest sources of uncertainty is the time at which the flight will 
actually take off. Takeoff time can be planned and controlled to, especially once the aircraft is 
taxiing. However, unpredictable events frequently occur both before leaving the parking gate 
and after. The aircraft may be ready to depart early or late relative to a planned or scheduled 
time. Until flight operators are able to better manage the boarding and preflight period, a 
trajectory that is planned in advance will likely need to be updated to reflect the actual gate 
departure time.  
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The turn-around process involves many actors, systems and planning functions which 
work towards a shared common departure time. Elements of disturbance impacting the 
flight till take-off stem from irregularities with security, passengers, fueling, aircraft 
technical maintenance, baggage handling, etc. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
Currently, aircraft taxiing in the airport movement area are handled first-come, first-served 
with the exception of controllers attempting to comply with departure release traffic management 
initiatives such as EDCTs. These TMIs often have a wide compliance window and are not 
always satisfied. Trajectories planned prior to takeoff will likely need to be updated based on the 
actual takeoff time. The runway assigned and terminal area flight pattern may not be known 
when planning the trajectory and, therefore, may result in required revisions to the assigned 
trajectory. 
Even if the TBO concept is applied to the surface such that the aircraft is following an 
assigned trajectory during taxi operations, the FMS is not able to control the aircraft and the 
navigational errors of the pilot manually taxiing the aircraft will be larger in the time dimension. 
(ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
4.4.1.7 Oceanic Airspace 
Prior work determined that in the oceanic domain, key contributors to residual trajectory 
uncertainty include: takeoff weight, push back timing, en route winds/turbulence, airport 
configuration (runway assignment and terminal area routing), airport congestion (e.g., arrival 
delays) and controller flexibility. Takeoff weight is not known until right before pushback. 
Oceanic wind forecasts are out of date by the time they are published. Furthermore, flight 
operators can only file routes that comply with constraints but controllers can provide clearances 
that utilize all of the airspace. For example, in oceanic airspace controllers will give them 
"wrong-way" altitudes since traffic is highly directional with time of day, but the flight operator 
cannot file a wrong-way altitude as the preferred trajectory (Fernandes, Rebollo, and Koch 
2016).  
4.4.1.8 NAS Changes 
If other flights change their trajectories or there are un-forecast NAS configuration changes 
(e.g., SAA opening or closing), a flight may be forced to change its trajectory. Therefore, these 
unpredictable events are sources of residual uncertainty. 
Air traffic behaves as a complex system, not just as a consequence of non-deterministic 
external factors influencing execution (e.g. weather or passengers) as previously 
explained, but also because of the high degree of interaction between many parallel 
operations: Individual flights interact with each other as they share the same resources 
like airspace and runways (separation shall be assured) and air traffic control (overload 
of sectors shall be avoided, complexity shall not exceed certain levels). A change in one 
flight may affect many others. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
4.4.1.9 Lack of Synchronization 
At times, the assigned trajectory may not be synchronized across all stakeholders and 
systems. For example, if one function, such as conflict detection, must adjust the aircraft’s 
trajectory quickly, there may be a period of time before the new trajectory is communicated to all 
of the other stakeholders, resulting in uncertainty for some of the system’s functions (Mondoloni 
2016). Furthermore, limitations in communication bandwidth (or the ability of the flight operator’s 
automation to process information) may cause some systems to not receive every update to the 
information about a flight. 
A continuous synchronization of information between all stakeholders is not technically 
feasible due to bandwidth and communication cost limitations. An event driven update 
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mechanism is required to trigger actors and systems about updates when surpassing a 
predefined threshold level, based on accuracy requirements for a specific ATM function. 
This includes for example the air-ground synchronization of the FMS trajectory 
prediction. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
4.4.1.10 Navigational Errors 
While generally small, some residual trajectory uncertainty exists due to errors in the aircraft 
following the trajectory. This error will be larger for aircraft not equipped with an FMS. 
Uncertainty in the altitude dimension includes navigation error (following the assigned altitude in 
the presence of dynamic air) as well as the potential for non-FMS aircraft to fail to level off at the 
assigned altitude. 
TBO concepts call for the controller to use closed or “elastic” (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) vectors 
commands when there is a tactical need for an aircraft to deviate from its assigned trajectory. 
These commands may be initially issued by voice, since datalink can take more time for the 
aircraft to receive and respond to the command. Until the controller enters the command into the 
automation, or the aircraft returns to its previously assigned trajectory, the automation systems 
predicting the trajectory, including the aircraft’s FMS, will be out of sync with the controller and 
flight crew. Even if the controller’s automation helps define a closed trajectory update, until that 
is synchronized with the aircraft, the pilots will be manually flying the verbally issued command 
and there is uncertainty with how aircraft will comply with instructions (e.g., delayed turn or 
slower turn). The ground automation may need to temporarily not use the aircraft’s intent data 
since the aircraft does not have the complete assigned trajectory. 
4.4.1.11 Communication 
Mondoloni (2012) investigates how ambiguities in CPDLC messages detract from trajectory 
prediction accuracy. 
4.4.2 Impacts of Residual Trajectory Uncertainty 
The effect of trajectory uncertainty in current NAS operations has been studied extensively. 
Archer and Landry (2014) is an example that studies how different uncertainties affect NAS-
level operations. Torres and Nagle (2016) investigates the effect of prediction uncertainty on 
arrival metering and interval management. Thipphavong and Schultz (2012) and Thipphavong 
(2013) study how errors in climb rate, due to aircraft weight and engine performance modeling 
errors, affect the performance of an adaptive algorithm designed to improve trajectory prediction 
of departing aircraft. Reynolds et al. (2013) addresses the problem of making ATM decisions 
when you know there is uncertainty and have a stochastic model of the uncertainty, using 
convective weather as the problem context. Kirkman, Gaydos, and Weitz (2014) describes an 
alternative time-based metering scheduling algorithm that is robust to trajectory prediction 
uncertainty. Mercer et al. (2013) describes a HITL simulation in which controllers use a time-
based metering tool to manage arrival flights under varying levels of trajectory uncertainty; the 
results showed that the human controllers were able to compensate for high levels of trajectory 
uncertainty. Garcia-Chico, Vivona, and Cate (2008) introduces a method for estimating the 
trajectory uncertainty, so that knowledge of the uncertainty can be used in ATM decision 
making. 
TBO will reduce but not eliminate trajectory uncertainty. 
Trajectory based operations need to be resilient to these changing circumstances and 
shall be able to deal with this residual unpredictability (“fine-tuning” the trajectory). 
(ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
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The ICAO TBO Concept identifies three cases: major deviations that require coordinating a 
new trajectory, minor deviations that do not require the trajectory to be changed, and deviations 
that although minor, due to circumstances such as proximate traffic, do require a new trajectory 
to be coordinated. 
Major deviations from a coordinated trajectory prediction occur and the earlier agreed 
TBO plan needs to be adjusted. Major deviations can be caused by significant 
unpredicted weather changes, unplanned runway closure, engine failure. Pre-departure 
deviations can be caused by irregularities with security, passengers, fueling, aircraft 
technical maintenance, baggage handling, etc. In those cases, trajectories may need to 
be re-planned and trajectory constraints need to be re-considered. 
Minor deviations from a coordinated trajectory prediction (e.g. due to deviation from a 
weather prediction) occur in reality, but the ATM network does not experience any 
problem because the tolerance levels of the trajectory and/or generic constraints 
(“sensitivity threshold”) are wide enough to allow this variation. The updated trajectory 
prediction will be synchronized, but there is no impact on the trajectory constraints. 
Minor deviations from a coordinated trajectory prediction (e.g. due to deviation from a 
weather prediction) occur in reality and the aircraft needs to re-adjust through a loop of 
continuous corrections to ensure it meets the trajectory and generic constraints that has 
a too small tolerance to accept the variation. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
4.4.2.1 Robustness to Uncertainty 
TBO requires the management of residual trajectory prediction uncertainty through reduction 
of the residual uncertainty, decision-making that is robust to the uncertainty, and a feasible 
revision process that is able to recover when the uncertainty does disturb the plan. Mondoloni 
(2016) focuses on robust decision-making by applying a margin and deferring uncertain 
decisions. 
Advanced Technologies & Oceanic Procedures (ATOP), controller automation for oceanic 
airspace, currently runs into problems when requiring each pre-cleared oceanic trajectory to be 
conflict free from departure to destination (Fernandes, Rebollo, and Koch 2016). The machine 
does not understand things that people understand. For example, two trajectories that require 
10 minutes of separation might be in conflict because they have only 9:59 separation. The 
automation will reject the flight plan during the negotiation stage, when the controller would 
easily be able to maintain separation and the residual uncertainty makes the separation 
prediction of 9:59 inaccurate.  
4.4.2.2 Tradeoff between Constraints and Uncertainty 
Trajectory constraint(s) may be used to reduce residual unpredictability, allowing 
separation provision within an enlarged conflict horizon without the need for additional 
separation buffers. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
Adding constraints to an aircraft’s assigned trajectory can have multiple purposes. Some 
constraints, to manage NAS resources and avoid unsafe airspace, are operationally necessary. 
Another purpose of trajectory constraints is to manage the trajectory uncertainty, which may be 
desirable to enable better TFM performance. Such constraints may benefit the MBT concept 
without being operationally necessary, but they reduce flexibility for the aircraft operator, 
creating a tradeoff. How many constraints, what type, and in what situations, should MBT use to 
manage uncertainty? High trajectory uncertainty reduces the performance of conflict detection 
technology and TFM initiatives, and may reduce the capacity of some airspace resources. In the 
extreme case, low uncertainty can be achieved by placing RTA constraints frequently along a 
tightly defined corridor. However, there is likely diminishing benefit as the trajectory uncertainty 
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is reduced further, and many types of unpredictable uncertainty cannot be reduced through 
constraints. 
4.4.2.3 Predictability and Flexibility Tradeoff 
From an airline perspective, some level of flexibility is required in this trajectory 
management loop for continuous optimization in an environment that contains residual 
unpredictability. From an ATM perspective, a certain level of predictability of flight 
behavior is needed to ensure the required performance of the ATM functions in support 
of these flights. There is, therefore, a need for a balance between the actual need of the 
ATM system and the needs of individual airspace users. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
High predictability implies low residual trajectory prediction uncertainty. High flight operator 
flexibility implies the flight is subject to few constraints, allowing the flight operator to change 
their desired trajectory at any time. If the flight operator was given high flexibility initially but was 
then required to not make any subsequent changes, that initial flexibility would not reduce future 
predictability. However, if the flight operator is allowed to alter its predicted trajectory at any 
time, then there is a direct tradeoff between predictability and flexibility. The larger the 
magnitude of the allowed trajectory flexibility, the larger the resulting trajectory uncertainty. For 
example, if the assigned trajectory provides a 10 nm lateral envelope, then there is at least that 
much trajectory uncertainty in the lateral position of the aircraft. Similar flexibility in the vertical 
and longitudinal dimensions results in uncertainty in the vertical position and the time at which 
the aircraft will reach specific points along its route. 
The trajectory uncertainty resulting from flexibility also depends on how likely the flight 
operator is to utilize the available flexibility. In the example that the flight operator is allowed to 
navigate laterally within a 10 nm corridor, in good weather the flight operator may have no 
reason to not follow the centerline of the corridor and the lateral uncertainty (i.e., the prediction 
error or predictability) may be much smaller than 10 nm. However, in scattered convective 
weather, the aircraft may weave between weather cells unpredictably and the lateral trajectory 
uncertainty may be based on the full 10 nm width of the corridor. 
Predictability and flexibility also each have different “dimensions”. For example, lateral, 
vertical, and longitudinal flexibility relate, respectively, to lateral positional, vertical positional, 
and temporal predictability. Other dimensions, such as near-term and longer-term, could also be 
postulated. The value of high trajectory predictability (i.e., low residual uncertainty) depends on 
the application and may only be needed in some dimensions. A TFM automation system 
responsible for metering arrivals into the destination airport only cares about when the flight will 
arrive at a particular point in the airspace; it does not care about how the aircraft got there. The 
aircraft could fly a constant speed or could fly very fast for a period of time and then very slow 
for the remainder of the time. The aircraft could fly the shortest path to the particular point or 
could fly a very circuitous route. None of these variations matter to the TFM automation system.  
In contrast, a conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) automation system responsible for 
ensuring separation between aircraft does care about the route the aircraft will follow and the 
aircraft speed profile along that route. The CD&R system cares about where the aircraft will be 
(and possibly its energy state) at every point in time, but for a shorter time into the future. 
Flexibility in changing the trajectory outside the time horizon of CD&R would have no effect on 
the predictability that is important to CD&R. 
The tradeoff between predictability and flexibility is complex because neither flexibility nor 
predictability is scalar in nature. In the design of the MBT concept, each dimension of flexibility 
will need to be examined for its impacts on predictability in the context of how that predictability 
is used within the concept.  
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4.4.2.4 Negotiation versus Centralized Command and Control 
The ICAO TBO Concept (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) states “While ATM’s primary function is to 
enable the safe and expeditious handling of air traffic, a secondary objective is to do so while 
optimizing the airspace user’s trajectories to the extent possible.” “Optimize trajectories” means 
allow the users to select trajectories that best meet their business metrics. 
One aspect of flexibility is the ability to negotiate both the initial trajectory assignment and 
trajectory assignment changes. The ability to request a trajectory change at any time, which 
could be an alternate route or could be a change in an assigned arrival slot which would require 
shuffling many other flights to accommodate, creates significant trajectory uncertainty that 
cannot easily be modeled. Eliminating trajectory negotiation from a TBO concept, therefore, 
improves trajectory predictability, especially in situations such as adverse weather or limited 
capacity in which flight operators are more likely to initiate trajectory changes. 
The argument against authoritarian control by the ANSP in determining the assigned 
trajectories in TBO concepts is that the ANSP cannot know the flight operator’s business 
objectives and, therefore, the traffic management solution (i.e., the set of all assigned 
trajectories) may be optimally efficient in terms of airspace resource usage but will not be 
optimal with respect to flight operator business interests. Many papers on trajectory negotiation 
make this point; Torres, Martin, Klooster, Hochwarth, et al. (2011) is an exception that argues 
sharing cost information could allow the ANSP to sufficiently consider the flight operator’s 
objectives. TBO without trajectory negotiation is similar to today’s NAS - the flight operators file 
a flight plan and the FAA tells the flight where to fly, which could be a different route than the 
operator filed. The pilot’s only recourse is to refuse the clearance. Negotiation has the potential 
to provide additional benefits but likely requires substantial more complexity and, therefore, cost 
to TBO concepts. This complexity and cost occurs on both the ANSP side of the concept as well 
as the flight operator’s side to be able to take part in the negotiation, which flight operators have 
historically been reluctant to invest claiming the benefits are uncertain. Whether the additional 
benefit justifies the additional cost is a question that warrants research that has not been 
performed. 
In the extreme case, flexibility to negotiate takes the form of self-organization. 
The concept is an application of the principles of self-organization (swarm theory) where 
safety and traffic flow management goals are achieved by broadcasting all the 
operational constraints on a 4D-Grid and populating the grid with the 4D-trajectories of 
all other flights. As new flights get added to the system the remaining capacity is in full 
view to prospective operators who will be able to plan flights using available capacity. 
The paper shows how self-organized air traffic leads to optimality… (Torres and 
Delpome 2012) 
Under some assumptions, self-organization can lead to maximum efficiency in some sense 
with maximum flexibility. However, the required assumptions are highly academic and not 
consistent with the NAS and the metric of optimality is likely not acceptable since the last flight 
to plan its trajectory is limited to whatever airspace resources have not already been claimed by 
other users. 
4.4.2.5 Variations between Residual Uncertainty 
The ATM functions differ significantly in the nature of the trajectory information they 
need, in particular their time horizon. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
Different predictions of the trajectory or different descriptions of the predicted trajectory, 
depending on how the MBT concept handles this situation, will have different trajectory 
uncertainty. The aircraft’s FMS predicts the aircraft’s trajectory, but only provides sparse 
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information about that predicted trajectory to other systems (e.g., estimated times at specific 
points along the trajectory). A ground-based conflict detection system needs a trajectory 
prediction that is spatially and temporally dense, so that no interpolation between points is 
required, but only over a relatively short time horizon. In contrast, a TFM automation system 
may require a less dense description of the predicted trajectory but over the full remaining 
trajectory of the aircraft (Mondoloni et al. 2016). A consequence of there being distinct trajectory 
predictions is that each may have different residual uncertainty (Cate 2013). 
The ICAO TBO concept (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) lists a TBO specific requirement: “The 
quality of service of the synchronization of the expected remainder of the trajectory… shall be 
commensurate with the required accuracy and reliability of the various ATM components…” In 
this concept, there is only one predicted trajectory because there is no assigned trajectory, but 
the concept accepts that different stakeholders should have different descriptions of it based on 
their needs. 
The process of sampling and encoding the trajectory prediction itself can contribute to lost 
information and, therefore, residual uncertainty. 
The effectiveness of TBO is limited by trajectory accuracy, which depends on prediction 
errors due to assumptions and limitations in the construction process (wind errors, 
unknown aircraft intent, etc.) and in losses introduced in the sampling and representation 
of the trajectory. Trajectory sampling is the process of selecting the points included in 
the trajectory that is exported to clients. Trajectory representation is the set of attributes, 
such as location, speeds, etc., associated with each trajectory point. Emerging trajectory 
exchange standards need to take into account the effects of sampling and 
representation because the loss of accuracy in trajectory representation has a direct and 
significant impact on the ability to support TBO (Torres 2013). 
4.4.2.6 Scope of Assigned/Predicted Trajectory 
A predicted trajectory that extends to the aircraft’s destination is essential for enabling the 
benefits of TBO with respect to improved TFM performance. The extent of the assigned 
trajectory is a topic of some debate in the literature. The ICAO TBO Concept preserves the 
concept of clearances that limit the flight’s authority to proceed toward its destination: 
Due to the residual unpredictability, it cannot be assured that the predicted trajectory will 
remain free of conflicts, even in the theoretical case that it would have been initially de-
conflicted from all other trajectories during flight preparation. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
One fundamental question regarding MBT, and TBO in general, is whether the trajectory 
must be, or should be, planned in detail all the way to the destination, or whether portions of the 
trajectory farther into the future can or should be planned in less detail. For example, before a 
flight leaves LAX going to JFK, should the trajectory include RTAs associated with arrival 
metering into JFK?  
The answer to this question has a profound impact on the required automation systems. 
Currently, TFM systems such as TBFM do not operate on such a long time horizon and would 
require enhancements and procedural changes to support assigning meter times 6 or more 
hours in advance. For example, TBFM currently includes a concept of freeze horizons in which 
meter times are calculated but can be changed each time the algorithm runs until the meter 
times need to be published to a controller for implementation. This allows the system to control 
to upstream meter times while downstream meter times continue to “float” based on actual 
events. One of the motivations for the concept of freeze horizons was to handle the increasing 
trajectory uncertainty at longer time horizons and the need for metering sequences to be 
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acceptable to controllers. Would MBT, or TBO in general, reduce the uncertainty and then alter 
the controller’s role such that freeze horizons could be removed? 
If the MBT concept is to assign RTAs many hours in advance, is the concept that these 
times would not change except in exceptional cases, or is the concept that these RTAs would 
be expected to change as the flight approaches that point along its trajectory? 
If the concept is that the RTAs would not change except in infrequent cases, is the trajectory 
uncertainty small enough or would trajectory uncertainty require larger buffers between flights 
which would result in inefficient use of airspace resources? One way to keep the uncertainty 
smaller is to require RTAs at some interval along the entire trajectory. This approach would 
impose constraints that are not necessarily required except by the concept design; would this 
reduced flexibility be unacceptable or reduce overall concept benefits? 
When unpredictability grows to the order of magnitude of the applicable separation 
criteria there is no point in further de-conflicting individual trajectories. However, it is 
possible to extend the conflict horizon, by adding one or multiple trajectory constraint(s) 
for separation purposes, reducing residual unpredictability. (ICAO-ATMRPP 2015) 
There have been many studies on compliance with RTAs under various situations and with 
various technology. All of the studies of which the authors are aware consider relatively short 
time horizons (i.e., not on a traffic management time horizon). In the absence of any 
“exceptional” events occurring, the compliance accuracy may not be dependent on the time 
horizon; this would have to be proven. However, what is the frequency of “exceptional” events 
that would disrupt the aircraft’s ability to achieve accurate compliance? How does the system 
perform in these situations; are the benefits greatly reduced? Would other flights experiencing 
an exceptional event cause a disruption that would affect the ability of other flights to comply 
with their RTAs or require those RTAs to be changed? 
Conflict detection and resolution is typically applied only a short time into the future, due to 
trajectory uncertainty. How long will this conflict detection horizon be in MBT? The answer likely 
depends on various factors that affect how the trajectory prediction uncertainty varies with time. 
If an RTA is assigned at a meter point hours into the future, conceivably conflict detection could 
be applied at that time horizon and the RTA would be calculated to be free of conflicts with other 
aircraft. Is there a benefit to TFM systems at long time horizons assuming specific flights at 
specific times, or would TFM systems work better if each flight were predicted as a probability 
distribution for when it would be demand on that resource and the TFM system would operate 
on the expected demand and its probability distribution? 
If the concept is that the RTAs at the meter points would change as the aircraft approached, 
then what is the value in assigning the RTAs many hours in advance? Does assigning the RTAs 
early, even if they will change, reduce the trajectory prediction uncertainty, which benefits TFM 
performance, or does it reduce flexibility for the aircraft? This likely depends on what other 
constraints exist along the trajectory. What is the best tradeoff between flexibility and reduced 
trajectory uncertainty? 
In either approach, there is still a predicted trajectory to the destination airport. If the RTA at 
the arrival meter point is not initially assigned, but will be assigned as the aircraft nears the 
destination airport, the trajectory uncertainty may seem to be larger until the RTA is assigned. 
However, if the RTA is assigned prior to departure but allowed to change (equivalent to saying 
there is a larger compliance bound around it that shrinks as the aircraft approaches the airport), 
then that initial RTA is not actually reducing trajectory uncertainty. If the RTA is assigned prior to 
departure and not allowed to change except in exceptional situations, then that RTA may be 
more constraining than necessary or desirable, but providing some improved predictability. 
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4.4.3 Enablers 
Reduced trajectory prediction uncertainty will be an outcome of TBO that will enable various 
benefit mechanisms. Reducing trajectory prediction uncertainty can also be viewed as 
something that will enable TBO.  
Considerable literature discusses how various aspects of TBO will result in improved 
predictability (i.e., less trajectory prediction uncertainty). Data from the aircraft can improve 
ground-based trajectory prediction (Mondoloni et al. 2016). Closed trajectories improve 
trajectory prediction accuracy. Trajectory synchronization ensures all stakeholders have access 
to improved trajectory predictions (López Leonés et al. 2013). 
4.4.4 Roadblocks to adopting the management of residual trajectory uncertainty 
Residual uncertainty is not a primary reason why TBO adoption has been slow. Modern 
TBO concepts recognize the existence of residual uncertainty and include concept elements to 
accommodate it. These concept elements, while adding some complexity beyond the original 
“perfect world” concept that trajectories would be planned once and then followed precisely with 
no disturbances, are no more difficult to develop than other aspects of TBO concepts. 
Understanding how much residual uncertainty will exist, how to minimize it, and how to tradeoff 
between accommodating uncertainty and expending additional effort to reduce it, may have 
occupied some research effort that could have otherwise gone toward adopting TBO concepts 
operationally. In this way, residual uncertainty has contributed to “concept paralysis” in which 
not knowing which TBO concept should be pursued has prevented quicker adoption of TBO. For 
example, questions such as what types of trajectory synchronization should be included in the 
concept and are multiple trajectory predictions permitted or must there be only one trajectory 
prediction has allowed academics to write numerous papers without a consensus that 
encourages moving forward with concept validation. 
4.4.5 Negative impacts of roadblock on MBT 
The lack of a single concept of operation for TBO has led to many different opinions about 
what TBO should be with little convergence by the ATM research community. The FAA needs to 
clearly define the TBO concept and the NAS Enterprise Architecture evolution associated with 
the transition to TBO. This provides an opportunity for NASA to provide leadership to help the 
FAA define the TBO concept elements, of which MBT is one. 
4.4.6 Specific implications for MBT 
Weather will continue to be a major contributor to residual trajectory uncertainty as well as 
TFM uncertainty. Yet it is well known in the ATM community that many DSTs do not perform 
well in dynamic situations such as weather (Gong and Mcnally 2015). This is not a coincidence 
– rather it is because they have not been designed to handle dynamic situations. Weather 
problems are often “assumed away” in the concept description or just completely ignored. The 
underlying justification, whether stated or not, is that most days in the NAS do not have major 
weather disruptions. Furthermore, the complexity of addressing the dynamic weather situations 
during concept evaluations limits their assessment. Thus, while lateral and temporal trajectory 
constraints are seen as the interface between TFM and MBT, the validity of these constraints in 
addressing demand/capacity imbalances in the presence of weather will likely be degraded. If 
these constraints create inefficiencies, MBT can provide flexibility and agility when the 
constraints are updated to mitigate to some extent the initial inefficiencies. 
4.5 Improved vertical profiles 
EDA has been previously discussed in Section 4.2.1.1.1. 
54 
4D FMS RTA flight trials are discussed in Section 5.2.2.1. 
Regarding the sharing of aircraft parameters to improve trajectory prediction, the ongoing 
FAA Advanced Trajectory Modeling project has shown that using aircraft mass, thrust, and drag 
is a straightforward approach because some ground automation trajectory predictors can use 
that data directly. However, the project has developed a method using TOD and iterative 
adjustment of thrust to adjust the predicted trajectory. 
4.6 User preferred routes and user preferred trajectories 
Eurocontrol defines a user preferred route (UPR) and user preferred trajectory (UPT) as 
follows: 
UPR – A route defined during the planning phase by Airspace Users, the UPR describes the 
entire airborne phase of a flight as an expression of their Business / Mission intentions.  
Note: Airspace Users are free to define UPRs taking into account the network constraints 
already defined and shared …25 
UPT - The trajectory initially provided by the Airspace User. 
Note: During planning phase, it may be amended by the AU to integrate ATM constraints … 
in execution phase, it may be revised to integrate new ATM constraints …26 
UPT includes the temporal element, which at a minimum would be departure time and ETA. 
A formal definition for UPR and UPT from the FAA perspective could not be found. Furthermore, 
it appears that there is disagreement among stakeholders whether UPR/UPT are intended to 
incorporate ATM constraints: 
For example, “User Preferred Trajectory” for some this means that the aircraft user can fly 
the aircraft anywhere they want with conflict resolution from a ‘separation manager’. To 
others it means that the user can choose any fixed adapted route or in some views choose a 
set of adapted routes with a controller choosing which of the ‘user preferred’ adapted routes 
will be flown (cf. Collaborative Trajectory Options Program). Despite these being widely 
differing concepts, the proponents of both will, at formal meetings, agree that they support 
‘User Preferred Trajectories’ and come to full agreement. (Wilson and Sipe 2016) 
4.6.1 Non-restrictive routing  
In domestic US operations, UPRs are limited to non-restrictive routing (NRR) airspace at 
and above FL 350: 
Special high altitude routes allow pilots routing options for flight within the initial high altitude 
routing (HAR) Phase I expansion airspace. Pilots are able to fly user-preferred routes, 
referred to as non-restrictive routing (NRR), between specific fixes described by pitch (entry 
into) and catch (exit out of) fixes in the HAR airspace. Pitch points indicate an end of 
departure procedures, preferred IFR routings, or other established routing programs where 
a flight can begin a segment of NRR. The catch point indicates where a flight ends a 
segment of NRR and joins published arrival procedures, preferred IFR routing, or other 
established routing programs. 
The HAR Phase I expansion airspace is defined as that airspace at and above FL 350 in 
fourteen of the western and southern ARTCCs. The airspace includes Minneapolis (ZMP), 
Chicago (ZAU), Kansas City (ZKC), Denver (ZDV), Salt Lake City (ZLC), Oakland (ZOA), 
                                                 
25 https://ext.eurocontrol.int/lexicon/index.php/User_Preferred_Route  
26 https://ext.eurocontrol.int/lexicon/index.php/User_Preferred_Trajectory  
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Seattle Centers (ZSE), Los Angeles (ZLA), Albuquerque (ZAB), Fort Worth (ZFW), Memphis 
(ZME), and Houston (ZHU). Jacksonville (ZJX) (FAA 2013b). 
NRR is an enhanced version of the North American Route Program (NRP) that began in the 
mid-90s. The primary difference is that NRP is constrained to NAVAID routes/fixes whereas 
NRR leverages RNAV waypoints (named waypoints or part of the NRS grid). A key drawback to 
NRP was identified in Lee et al. (2008):  
NRP had limited success in spite of its inherent route flexibility because aircraft were 
often (“90% of the time”) taken off of NRP routes for one reason or another, so airlines 
stopped requesting them. Currently, the number of aircraft that fly NRP is lower than 
during the earlier years of its implementation. One problem contributing to its lack of use 
was a lack of suitable routes through congested terminal areas, creating problems for 
ATCs – i.e. many of the NRP-filed aircraft were taken off their routes due to incompatible 
entry and exit points near the SIDs and STARs. NRR addressed this by using pitch and 
catch points (described in the previous section) to facilitate exit from / entry into 
congested terminal areas. 
Surprisingly, NRR appears to be suffering the same fate as NRP:  
When the HAR elements were first introduced, UPS also started filing flights with pitch 
and catch points, but was not able to gain any benefit from them, as it was very common 
for the ATC to cancel the flight plan and reroute the aircraft …UPS found that for their 
operations, it was most efficient to file their flights in line with what the ATCs were least 
likely to cancel (Lee et al. 2008). 
Another reason for lack of acceptability of NRR by controllers, TMCs, and pilots is the 
underlying NRS grid of waypoints which is described below: 
NRS waypoint names are composed of two letters followed by two numbers, followed by 
a single letter … The first and second characters of NRS waypoints are the FIR identifier 
for the United States (“K”) and the FIR subdivision, or ARTCC center in which the 
waypoint is located (e.g. “D” for Denver ARTCC). The third and fourth characters are a 
number group representing the latitude of the waypoint. These numbers begin at the 
equator with 00 and advances north and south from 01 to 90 and correspond to every 10 
minutes of latitude and repeating every 15°. The final character in the NRS waypoint is a 
letter representing the line of longitude for which the waypoint is located. This identifier 
starts at the prime meridian moving west to east and uses the letters A to Z while 
repeating every 26° (Pruchnicki, Christopher, and Burian 2011). 
Despite training efforts, Lee et al. (2008) and Pruchnicki, Christopher, and Burian (2011) 
identified several human factors and other issues with NRS waypoints: 
 Controller, TMC, and pilot unfamiliarity with waypoints outside of their normal airspace 
environment 
 Both alphabetic and numeric characters must be typed on the keyboard, which is more 
time-consuming (and likely more prone to data-entry errors) 
 Similarity of waypoint names in a route could cause confusion and lead to data entry 
errors (e.g., KG78K-KP90G-KP09A). 
 Five or six syllables to pronounce instead of one to three syllables for conventionally 
named waypoints 
 NRS has not gained traction beyond the US so the FIR identifier “K” is unnecessary 
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 FMS database storage limitations 
 Lack of ability to overlay the NRS grid structure over their respective radar and 
navigation displays greatly reduced the usability of NRS waypoints in their daily 
operations. 
 If NRS is used as an adjunct tool in addition to the current system, its use is likely to 
drop in preference to the original non-NRS system as the workload and/or the traffic 
complexity increases 
Anecdotally, it is known that controllers accept UPRs when traffic levels are very low and 
cancel them when traffic levels are high because of the complexity caused by ad hoc 
intersecting flows. What is not known is the threshold between acceptance and cancellation. A 
significant amount of dynamic airspace configuration research was conducted by NASA in the 
2007-2012 timeframe of which the authors of this report were involved. A large focus of this 
research was investigating when to adjust sector boundaries to mitigate unacceptable levels of 
complexity, which is often used as a proxy for controller workload. To the authors’ knowledge, 
no research has been performed to identify the traffic level threshold where UPR requests 
should be accepted or rejected. This could be an MBT concept element or a concept on its own. 
Although not specifically related to UPR, one way to manage route unavailability uncertainty 
is to employ a design paradigm that focuses on providing actionable information to operational 
personnel without explicitly telling them what decision to make. This design paradigm was 
utilized in the development of RAPT. 
RAPT improves departure rates by determining the specific routes and times that will be 
affected by operationally significant thunderstorm activity before a storm moves into a 
specific region. RAPT helps decrease weather-related departure delays and ground 
holding by providing air traffic managers with automated, objective guidance for: 
 Visualizing the impact of approaching weather systems 
 Determining when to close and reopen departure routes 
 Determining optimum departure routing on the basis of forecasts of convective 
weather 
 Determining when to allow limited route usage during thunderstorms (LL/MIT 2012) 
The RAPT counterpart for arrivals, Arrival Route Status and Impact (ARSI), is part of TFMS 
Work Package 4 (FAA 2013a). 
 
4.6.2 Success stories 
4.6.2.1 ASPIRE partnership 
The ASPIRE (Asia Pacific Initiative to Reduce Emissions) partnership was formed in 2008; a 
partnership between Airways New Zealand, the FAA, and Airservices Australia. Membership 
has since extended to include the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore and the Japan Civial 
Aviation Bureau. Flights meeting the minimum equipage requirements are able to file UPRs to 
support their business objectives. These flights are also able to take advantage of DARP 
(described in Section 4.3) and 30/30 (30 nm lateral and 30 nm longitudinal) reduced oceanic 
separation.27 
                                                 
27 http://www.aspire-green.com/dailyroutes/default.asp  
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4.6.2.1.1 Enablers 
ATOP provides a fully modernized oceanic ATC automation system. ATOP significantly 
reduced the intensive manual processes of the old system that limited the ability of controllers to 
safely handle airline requests for more efficient tracks or altitudes over long oceanic routes. 
ATOP fully integrates flight and radar data processing, provides satellite data link 
communication and surveillance capabilities, and detects conflicts between aircraft. Collectively, 
these capabilities enabled aircraft separation standards to be reduced, thereby dramatically 
increasing capacity and efficiency.28 
4.6.2.2 Optimized Profile Descent procedures 
OPD procedures have been developed to provide UPTs in the vertical dimension during 
arrival. The OPD procedure is designed to provide flexibility to pilots to begin the descent based 
on the FMS determinations of the optimal TOD location. Figure 9 depicts the RIIVR2 arrival. 
Anywhere along the top of the yellow region is allowable for the TOD. 
 
Figure 9. RIIVR2 arrival vertical profile restrictions29 
4.6.3 Roadblocks to adopting UPR/UPT 
 Controller complexity and traffic density in the eastern US will continue to prevent the 
use of UPRs in that region. 
 No research has been performed to identify the traffic level threshold where UPR 
requests should be accepted or rejected. 
 FMS database capacity limitations impact UPR flight planning capabilities and potential 
airborne rerouting. 
 Human factors issues associated with the NRS grid can tip the scale towards denying 
UPRs. 
 Misunderstanding among stakeholders about whether UPTs include constraints can 
delay progress. 
                                                 
28 https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/atop/  
29 Courtesy of: http://www.ifatca.org/ 
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 Many SOPs/LOAs contain trajectory constraints that are unknown to the navigation 
databases used by the FMS and FOC flight planning applications, which can result in 
flight plans getting amended to support ANSP needs. 
4.6.4 Negative impacts of roadblock 
Trajectory negotiation is one of the MBT benefits that allows users to see direct, tangible 
benefits across the fleet or for individual flights. If these roadblocks cannot be addressed, then it 
will limit user participation and the loss of a key benefit. 
5. Safety considerations for MBT 
5.1 Safety Objectives 
There are two common methods for establishing safety objectives, and either method could 
be applied in support of an MBT concept. The first method, and most common in regulatory 
applications, is through the establishment of a Target Level of Safety (TLS). Within the FAA, the 
TLS is established through application of risk matrices that provide the acceptable likelihood for 
events falling within a range of severity categories. FAA Order 8040.4A prescribes the FAA’s 
Safety Risk Management Policy, provides a risk matrix for use by subordinate offices, and 
supports Safety Management System Guidance found in FAA Order 8000.369 (FAA 2012), 
(FAA 2016a). It should be noted that Order 8040.4 is currently under revision and a new version 
is expected to be released in the spring of 2017. One of the most significant updates is a new 
distinction between general and commercial aviation and the establishment of a new risk matrix 
that will apply only to general aviation. Also, the new risk matrices will be consistent with the 
matrix found in the FAA Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System Manual and the 
FAA Safety Risk Management Guidance for Systems Acquisitions, a pair of documents that 
may contain relevant policy for establishing safety objectives for MBT (FAA 2016d), (FAA 
2014b). Figure 10 is a representation of the applicable risk matrix. 
 
Figure 10: FAA Risk Matrix 
An alternative method of establishing an aviation safety objective is more commonly found 
in use by commercial air carriers. The method involves assessing the current level of risk and 
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establishing an objective of meeting or improving upon the current risk level without reference to 
a numeric target. The rationale for this method is business oriented. Commercial airlines value 
their safety reputation with the flying public and attribute substantial cost with potential accidents 
that not only include the cost of the accident itself, but also the reduction in consumer demand 
that may result in the wake of an accident. Therefore, they are generally unwilling to accept the 
cost associated with an increase in the expected frequency of accidents even if the likelihood of 
an accident meets the criteria for acceptability as defined in government regulations. 
5.2 Influence of Safety on MBT 
In reviewing literature associated with trajectory based operations and related applications, 
no documents have been found that report an unacceptable level of safety risk as a direct 
barrier to implementation of the concept. However, safety risk has consistently influenced the 
feasibility of implementing concepts associated with time-based or trajectory-based operations. 
In general, safety assessments supporting TBO concepts have led to the introduction of new 
hazards, or an increase in the likelihood of accidents due to existing hazards. In both cases, 
mitigation strategies have been developed to reduce risk to an acceptable level, but these 
strategies often lead to the concept itself becoming infeasible either due to the level of 
investment that would be necessary to achieve acceptable risk, the need to create more 
complex exclusionary airspace in the absence of full equipage, or due to the negative impact 
the mitigation strategy would have on system efficiency. Selected issues and lessons learned 
from previous attempts at TBO implementation that may be relevant to the current initiative are 
described below. 
5.2.1 Mixed Equipage 
In the US, most discussions of TBO concepts include an implied or explicitly stated 
requirement for new or enhanced automation on the ground and in the air as well as for data 
communications between ground and airborne systems. In a paper produced by MITRE 
documenting results of the 2011 TBO flight trials in Seattle, the introduction states more 
research is needed in the areas of “mixed equipage operations, pilot/controller workload 
impacts, automation requirements, standards, certification, and training needs …” (Wynnyk et 
al. 2013). The remainder of the paper is generally positive in its tone, but implies that in order for 
TBO to be feasible, these areas will have to be developed. More specifically, assertions are 
made that all aircraft will need to be equipped with a full phase FMS that includes RTA 
capability as well as data communication technology to support trajectory negotiation; 
automation systems will need to be replaced or updated; and finally, additional training for 
aircrew and controllers will be necessary. 
Since the dawn of aviation, aircraft operating in the airspace system have been equipped 
with different systems that deliver different capabilities. However, throughout most of that 
history, this condition did not represent a mixed equipage problem. This is because throughout 
the twentieth century, air traffic management system design accounted for operation of all 
aircraft to allow safe sequencing and separation through consistent application of a common set 
of standards and procedures. When technology emerged that became essential to the 
management of all air traffic, such as the transponder, and more recently ADS-B, that equipage 
was mandated for all IFR aircraft through Federal regulation. In other cases, air traffic 
management concepts have been developed that require systems with certain performance 
characteristics to safely achieve design objectives, yet do not rise to a level that supports an 
equipage mandate. While this approach may deliver benefits for operators that meet the 
equipage requirements, the benefits come at the expense of excluding operators who are not 
able to equip, or simply decide not to equip, from being able to use the airspace. Examples of 
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this design philosophy include the North Atlantic Track System and Reduced Vertical 
Separation Minima. Today, this airspace is only used by commercial aircraft or high-end general 
aviation aircraft that have made business decisions to equip with systems meeting the minimum 
requirements for operation in these areas. Since MBT is being designed to support 
management of all IFR traffic, it follows that if the concept is designed to rely on equipage of 
specific systems, concept success will depend heavily on an equipage mandate, or 
alternatively, on operators voluntarily investing in new systems for their aircraft. If a mandate 
requiring equipage beyond ADS-B is not possible due to political constraints, feasibility of the 
MBT design will largely be determined by the business case for the operator. Thus, if the safety 
case for an MBT concept requires aircraft to equip with expensive systems to achieve a level of 
safety risk that is considered acceptable to both regulators and operators, the safety 
requirements may indirectly inhibit implementation. 
Barring a mandate, it seems unlikely that operators of most general aviation aircraft, some 
military aircraft, and certain types of unmanned aircraft will equip with any of the systems 
expected to be necessary to execute the current vision associated with managing aircraft by 
trajectory. It seems reasonable to expect that aircraft will continue to include a variety of 
systems and capabilities, but so long as all aircraft can be managed regardless of their 
individual configuration, these variations will have little impact on the safety case. This was 
found to be true during 2009-2010 European flight trials designed to test the performance of 
aircraft in complying with RTA clearances in the vicinity of the Stockholm Arlanda Airport. During 
a series of flight tests, aircraft equipped with a full spectrum of flight management systems were 
tested, including aircraft equipped with systems that included RTA functionality as well as 
systems that did not. The results were summarized as follows: 
The results show that aircraft equipped with the most advanced Flight Management 
Systems were able to meet an assigned time with 30 second accuracy in 88% of the 
CASSIS trials. Even MD80 pilots who adjusted speed manually to meet a CTA could do 
so with 30 second accuracy in 73% of the case (Swedavia 2009). 
A concept that depends exclusively on specific automation capabilities will necessarily 
create a mixed equipage environment in which some aircraft are considered “haves” while 
others are considered “have nots.” From an ATM perspective, this creates a new requirement 
for ATC to manage at least two different classes of aircraft that are executing two fundamentally 
different processes, and this seemingly subtle difference may have a significant influence on the 
safety case. 
In considering the expected safety case for introducing a new mixed equipage environment, 
a requirement would emerge for controllers to maintain proficiency in all of the current skillsets 
necessary to safely manage traffic as equipped in today’s environment, and then add to that by 
learning to manage aircraft by trajectory as well. The ATM environment will become more 
complex as both existing and MBT processes will be in place at the same time with no 
reasonable expectation that legacy procedures will be retired. A mixed equipage concept may 
also lead to a perceived requirement for airspace redesign accommodating or excluding 
different types of operations based on equipage, adding additional complexity to the airspace 
system. Historically, proposals of this nature have been accompanied by risk assessments that 
cite expected increases in controller workload, cognitive demands, and vigilance as safety 
concerns. A similar safety concern is an expected increase in the level of controller proficiency 
that would be necessary to support the vision. In this regard, the timing of implementation can 
be relevant to the safety case as the air traffic control community is not uniformly populated by 
age, and concern has been expressed at recent safety panels that large numbers of retirements 
will occur during relatively short periods of time. As the retired controllers are replaced, the 
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overall experience level of the ATC community could be significantly reduced at a time when a 
transition to new ATM concepts requires a high level of performance by controllers.  
It is virtually certain that a concept would not be proposed if it introduced an inherently high 
risk, but instead, it should be expected that an attempt would be made to mitigate the risk in 
some way to achieve an acceptable level of risk. In general, risk mitigation efforts have typically 
led to either reductions in capacity to the point where the future system state is expected to be 
less efficient than the current system, or the level of investment necessary to achieve an 
acceptable level of risk exceeds any expectation of benefits. One of many examples of this from 
the literature is found in a paper delivered by Joel Klooster and David De Smedt at the Ninth 
USA/Europe ATM R&D Seminar in 2011. The paper reports the results of a study in which over 
30,000 simulated flights were sequenced by time across a meter fix to assess the benefit of 
using the RTA function of a modern FMS to achieve a reduction in the variance of crossing 
times when sequencing and spacing a stream of arrivals. One of the experimental objectives 
was to evaluate the frequency with which separation losses, defined as less than 5 NM 
separation and less than 1000 feet vertical separation, occur between pairs of aircraft assigned 
to cross the meter fix at 8,000 feet with a 90 second time interval scheduled between them. The 
study acknowledged that frequent separation loss events would inhibit acceptability and after 
observing initial disappointing results, the test was re-run with a 120 second interval. The results 
indicate that approximately five percent of the aircraft pairs suffered separation losses with a 90 
second interval, and 2.5% when the interval was increased to 120 seconds (Klooster and De 
Smedt 2011). While the increased interval between aircraft reduced the number of separation 
loss events, a 2-minute interval between aircraft represents a significant reduction in capacity 
compared to the current system in which aircraft are routinely sequenced with 60-90 seconds 
between them. As another approach to mitigating the safety risk, the paper recommends 
development of an additional support tool to alert controllers to situations that may result in less 
than 5 NM of separation, effectively conceding that for the concept to provide a measurable 
improvement over today’s system, its implementation will require substantial additional 
investment. 
5.2.2 TBO Standards 
An important influence on aviation safety is the standard that defines the minimum 
separation allowed between aircraft operating within a volume of airspace. With the benefit of 
hindsight and lessons learned through recent research, it is instructive to review previous 
attempts to evaluate trajectory based operational concepts and re-assess results and 
conclusions regarding the success or failure of previous trials and experiments. 
Three-dimensional distance-based standards have been a pillar of separation assurance 
since the implementation of radar in the early 1950’s. The objective of distance-based 
separation is to provide enough distance between aircraft to ensure there is adequate time to 
recognize a conflict and take action to avoid an accident. All previous attempts to implement 
elements of trajectory based operations have included either an explicit or implied assumption 
that distance-based standards would remain in place as part of the operational concept. 
However, recent research has led to a conclusion that due to inescapable properties of 
aerospace physics, if aircraft are to be sequenced in four dimensions, they cannot be separated 
in three dimensions. 
5.2.2.1 FAA 4D FMS RTA Flight Trials 
One of the most compelling examples found within the literature supporting a requirement 
for four-dimensional separation is associated with a series of flight trials and HITL simulations 
sponsored by the FAA between 2010 and 2013. During initial simulation and flight trials in the 
vicinity of Seattle, Washington, and in partnership with Alaska Airlines, Boeing 737 aircraft 
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equipped with General Electric FMS were issued RTA clearances at the Olympia fix on the 
Olympia Six Standard Arrival to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. There have been several 
updates to this arrival since the flight trials, but a copy of the arrival used at that time is shown in 
Figure 11 (Amefia and Lowry 2010). 
 
 
Figure 11: Olympia 6 STAR to SEATAC, 2010-2011 
The important details on this arrival are that for turbojets landing north, the crossing 
limitation at Olympia is 12,000 feet and 250 knots (indicated or calibrated airspeed). However, 
landing south, the limit is 17,000 feet and 280 knots. In 2010, all participating aircraft were 
sequenced through Olympia while the airport was landing south. 
The concept being tested was to issue RTAs to arrivals at Olympia in one minute intervals, 
and the test was successful with no safety concerns, and specifically, no separation loss events. 
However, the reason for this result was not fully understood at the time. On a standard day, an 
aircraft operating at 17,000 feet and 280 knots indicated airspeed will be flying at 364 knots true 
airspeed, the speed the aircraft is traveling through the air mass. The true airspeed is 
significantly higher than the indicated airspeed because of the density of the air. In general, as 
air density decreases at higher altitudes, true airspeed will increase. 
When the airport is configured to use the south-flow runways, it is normally because 
prevailing winds are generally out of the south, meaning aircraft crossing Olympia would expect 
a tailwind (barring a wind shift somewhere below them). During the flight trial, this was routinely 
the case, and the winds at altitude were typically stronger than the surface winds. A fifty knot 
wind is not unusual at 17,000 feet. Also, aircraft are permitted to gradually reduce speed to 
cross the fix at the constrained speed, so they are often flying faster than the limit as they 
approach the fix. Thus, the aircraft ground speed, which is the speed it is traveling over the 
ground or the true airspeed corrected for wind, was approximately 420 knots, or 7 nm per 
minute. By sequencing the aircraft at one minute intervals, the result was about 7 nm of physical 
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distance between the aircraft as they crossed Olympia, and this separation is very comfortable 
for controllers who are required to maintain a 5 NM minimum separation in this sector. Also, 
from an airport capacity perspective, the concept was considered potentially feasible as this 
separation was roughly equal to what was being provided manually by controllers through 
assignment of vectors and speed constraints. 
With the success of the 2010 trials, the 2011 trials were designed to be more robust. An 
important difference was that in 2011 aircraft could participate regardless of the airport runway 
configuration. Of particular interest, in addition to repeating the high/fast arrival profiles 
observed during the 2010 trails, aircraft in the 2011 trial would be able to cross Olympia at 
12,000 feet and 250 KIAS. The important difference is found by comparing the aerospace 
physics. The indicated airspeed of an aircraft landing north would be 30 knots slower and 
altitude would be 5,000 feet lower than if it were landing south. As a result of flying this slower 
speed at a lower altitude, the true airspeed on a standard day would only be 300 knots. With 
prevailing winds out of the north, the aircraft would also have some headwind component, 
further reducing its ground speed. This would make the resulting ground speed closer to 4 nm 
per minute. When aircraft flying at this speed are separated by one minute intervals, the 
physical distance is only 4 nm, a distance that is classified as a loss of separation and one that 
would be considered a serious safety violation. 
During simulation events conducted at the FAA W. J. Hughes Technical Center in 
preparation for the 2011 flight trials, procedures and flight profiles to be executed during the live 
flight trials were exercised with generally positive results in terms of human factors evaluations 
for both pilots and controllers (Teller 2011). However, concern arose during safety risk 
management panel proceedings regarding the amount of distance between aircraft separated 
by one minute at lower altitude meter fixes, and the potential for separation loss between aircraft 
became a significant safety issue that threatened to cancel the 2011 live flight trials. To mitigate 
the safety risk, documentation shows the flight trials team decided to increase the minimum 
interval from one minute to two minutes (FAA 2011). This mitigation solved the immediate safety 
concern and eliminated separation loss events in simulation, opening the door for execution of 
the live flight trial. However, it eventually resulted in the test (and in fact the entire concept) 
being considered operationally infeasible due to the excessive spacing between RTA aircraft. 
This was especially true for arrivals at Olympia when the airport was in a south flow 
configuration as they were routinely separated by approximately 15 nm, resulting in a significant 
reduction in airport capacity compared to existing methods that consistently delivered aircraft 
across the fix with between five and seven nautical miles of separation. 
With the benefit of understanding the complex relationship between altitude, air density, 
wind, a variety of airspeed expressions, distance, and time, the results of the Klooster study 
cited in the previous section can now be explained more fully. The separation losses 
experienced during this study were largely the result of evaluating the concept at 8,000 feet and 
applying legacy distance-based standards. It is interesting to consider possible differences in 
results that would likely have been achieved if Klooster and De Smedt had chosen to use a high 
altitude meter fix. For example, these researchers might have selected the 19,000 foot crossing 
altitude at Sayge on the arrival to Denver (the same fix used in 2012-2013 FAA HITL 
simulations). If they had done so, the results would almost certainly have been different and the 
conclusions stated in that report would likely have been more optimistic. 
5.2.2.2 Time-based separation for Wake Turbulence in Europe 
While time-based concepts are being developed both in the United States and Europe, 
recent changes to separation standards indicates European regulatory agencies are keenly 
aware of the benefits of both sequencing and separating aircraft by time, leading to a 
progression toward implementation of time-based separation standards. 
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In January 2015, the United Kingdom issued an update to its separation standards through 
an Aeronautical Information Circular. This circular restated existing category standards for wake 
turbulence as well as the well-established time-based standards for departures and the 
distance-based standards for arrivals. However, this circular introduced a new time-based 
separation standard for arrivals as an alternative to the distance-based standards. The 
separation minima is reproduced from this circular in Figure 12 (UK Civil Aviation Authority 
2015). 
 
Note: # Signifies that separation for wake turbulence reasons alone is not necessary 
Figure 12: UK Time-Based Separation Standard for Arrivals 
According to the European Commission’s website, headwinds are responsible for 44% of 
arrival delays at Heathrow, translating into nearly 3,000 hours of annual delay at that airport 
alone. The implementation of a time-based standard has eliminated approximately 60% of this 
delay and resulted in a measurable increase in airport capacity with increases being directly 
proportional to wind speed. As an example data point, with wind speeds of 20 knots, the airport 
is able to achieve approximately 3 additional arrivals per hour (European Commission 2017). 
Beyond the direct benefits achieved by a time-based separation standard, opportunities for 
indirect benefits are also created. Runway optimization is an area of research that has 
generated a variety of innovative approaches to sequencing arrivals, but a review of the 
literature reveals that many of the algorithms are dependent upon application of time-based 
separation standard for both departures and arrivals, and adherence to distance-based 
standards has inhibited acceptance and implementation of many promising approaches. As one 
example, a simulation-based optimization approach was presented (Soykan and Rabadi 2016), 
but the metaheuristic algorithm proposed is based in part on a time-based separation standard 
for arrivals that is nearly identical to the one presented in Figure 12. 
5.2.2.3 Required Time Performance and Time-of-Arrival Control Standards 
Armed with the lessons learned from multiple studies conducted between 2010 and 2013, 
more recent research has focused on overcoming the inherent limitations of applying distance-
based standards to time-based sequences of aircraft. A 2011 JPDO TBO Study Team report 
provided a detailed analysis of existing capabilities and an overview of implementation 
challenges. Among the areas of research identified as being needed to support implementation 
of a TBO concept is the development of a Required Time Performance (RTP) metric where “the 
objective is to meet the required time with a precision consistent with the density of traffic” 
(JPDO 2011b). The expected metric would also serve to complement the existing RNP 
standard, leading to concept implementation supported by a pair of metrics that would fully 
describe any aircraft’s performance capability in four dimensions. 
In 2014, RTCA Special Committee 227 developed an alternative to RTP and published a 
Time-of-Arrival Control (TOAC) standard in DO-236. Unfortunately, the TOAC standard falls 
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short of complementing the RNP standards and instead creates a “bookend” standard that 
creates a mixed equipage problem in which aircraft will either meet the standard or not. The key 
element of the RTCA standard is a requirement stating “the system shall be capable of meeting 
10 seconds of TOAC accuracy for descent operations and 30 seconds of TOAC accuracy for 
cruise operations” (RTCA 2013). This standard was developed without reference to a mature 
concept of operations, and has several shortcomings. Data from multiple flight and simulation 
tests show that cruise TOAC is more accurate than TOAC in the descent environment, mainly 
because of the substantial uncertainty associated with descending through dramatically 
changing environmental conditions and descent procedures where jet aircraft are designed to 
operate their engines at very low power settings, making engines less responsive than when 
operated at higher settings in cruise flight. Any system capable of achieving a 10 second TOAC 
performance in descending flight should be expected to deliver at least the same if not better 
performance in cruise flight, yet the standard calls for a substantially higher performance in the 
descent phase. The standard also overlooks climbing flights altogether, and there is no 
justification cited for either the 10 or 30 second values. 
As an alternative to a bookend standard, a categorical standard could be developed in the 
same way many other standards are expressed within the Federal Regulations. This would 
immediately provide benefits as categories could be established to describe aircraft 
performance over a full spectrum of the performance range such that all aircraft would fall into 
one of the categories. This would allow elimination of the mixed equipage problem created by 
the bookend standard as all IFR aircraft could be sequenced by time, but it would also allow 
progressively shorter intervals between aircraft as they are certified in higher performance 
categories. 
In 2014, research funded by NASA through the Virginia Space Grant Consortium resulted in 
publication of a Required Time Performance metric that retains all of the benefits of a 
categorical standard, but adds additional capability (Bell and Gheorghe 2014). One of the main 
advantages of an RTP standard is a provision for the ability to address important variables that 
are unaccounted for in other types of standards. For example, if FMSs are developed by 
different manufacturers, it is reasonable to expect the algorithms driving TOAC performance to 
be different. Data from flight tests show trends in performance associated with different FMSs, 
especially with regard to mean crossing time errors. Simply put, some systems have a tendency 
to deliver aircraft early while others have shown a tendency to deliver aircraft late. If aircraft with 
dissimilar performance characteristics are sequenced at a fix with the late tendency aircraft 
preceding the early tendency aircraft, substantially less separation time and substantially higher 
collision risk will result even though both aircraft meet the bookend TOAC standard. In contrast, 
RTP standards have been developed to account for both mean crossing time error and 
variance. 
The RTP metric complements the existing RNP metric by expressing time performance 
based on an underlying probability distribution in the same way RNP standards are expressed. 
That is, the performance of the aircraft is described in an RTP-x format, where x is a variable 
that quantifies the time-based performance of the system with a desired confidence level. The 
variable x is derived in such a way that it provides control over both the mean crossing time 
error and the standard deviation of that error, allowing manufacturers freedom to design 
algorithms that best support the needs of the operator while simultaneously providing a metric 
that is capable of governing aircraft sequencing with an acceptable level of safety risk as 
determined through application of collision risk models. Finally, whereas a decision to upgrade 
the performance of an aircraft’s TOAC system may not be sufficient to achieve the requirement 
of a bookend standard, or to move to a different standard within a category system, the RTP-x 
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standard allows individual aircraft to achieve incremental benefits, allowing operators to 
measure the return on investment expected at any equipage level. 
5.2.3 Data Communications 
The general rule for using CPDLC for ATC clearances is that the application should only be 
used for “non-time-critical” messaging or clearances. 
The exact definition of time allocations for CPDLC in the domestic airspace is given in DO-
350A (RTCA SC-214 2016a). When using ground initiated messages covered by the RCP130 
requirement (RCP is Required Communications Performance), the overall transaction time 
including time to send the message, flight crew response time and downlink time is roughly two 
minutes for the 99.9% Continuity.30 However most of the round trip transaction times will be a 
little over a minute, with 95% probability. The time required to send the clearance from the 
ground automation to the flight deck avionics, one-way, is well less than a minute. Therefore, 
CPDLC can be used for tactical clearances in some situations even though the latency is not 
instantaneous. CPDLC is especially useful for complex clearances that are difficult to transmit 
by voice. 
Procedures will have to be developed for CPDLC for each of the relevant use cases and a 
safety analysis for be performed for each scenario. 
5.2.3.1 Data Formats for Time 
During HITL testing in 2013, researchers found that different systems applying time-based 
clearances and constraints used different formats to express portions of minutes. In general, 
either a minutes and seconds format is used or a minutes and tenths of minutes is used. This 
discrepancy can influence human factors in the cockpit or ATC facility as operators can become 
distracted if time is requested or provided in one format while an automation system requires it 
in another format. To address this concern, researchers found that limiting RTA clearances to 6 
second intervals provided an effective mitigation by allowing easy mental conversion between 
the two formats (Alexander et al. 2013).  
5.2.4 Shared Situation Awareness 
Within the current ATM environment, a majority of communications are transmitted by voice. 
A benefit of this process is that all aircrew in a controller’s sector hear all communications and 
gain awareness of their environment by listening to radio transmissions that are not directly 
intended for their aircraft. For instance, aircrew may overhear a conversation between ATC and 
an aircraft 100 miles in front of them regarding turbulence at their flight level and the success of 
a preceding crew in finding a smooth ride by descending to a lower flight level. By virtue of the 
communication being available to all aircrew, situation awareness is improved and leads to 
more efficient communications as subsequent aircrew can make a single request to descend to 
the smooth flight level. In contrast, if the first aircraft were to negotiate an altitude change via 
data communications, a process of trial and error might ensue in which each successive aircraft 
requests a series of climbs and descents in search of a smooth ride. 
Similarly, there is a well-established culture of communications between pilots and 
controllers that provides intangible benefits. At times, voice inflection can be just as important as 
the words spoken on the radio. As an example, on the afternoon of January 15, 2009, US 
Airways flight 1549 departed La Guardia and lost both engines due to multiple bird strikes. The 
Captain of the aircraft never declared an emergency, but a subtle change in the tone of his 
voice communicated the seriousness of the circumstances. A more interesting observation that 
often goes overlooked is the response by other pilots operating in the same sector at that time. 
                                                 
30 Continuity is defined as the probability that the transaction completes within the expiration time  
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Routine communications all but stopped and none of the communications that took place during 
the emergency were initiated by aircrew (FAA 2009). They were all immediately aware of the 
gravity of the situation and understood that they could delay their communications to allow the 
air traffic controller to devote all of his attention to US Airways 1549. 
As a final anecdotal example, a pilot departing a busy airport in a light Cessna might be 
issued clearance to climb to and maintain 7,000 feet. An opposite direction B737 could be 
cleared to descend and maintain 8,000 feet, providing acceptable vertical separation between 
IFR aircraft. However, while the minimum standards are met, an experienced controller would 
likely issue a vector to one of the aircraft to provide horizontal separation as well – something 
that is not required by instruction or policy – but due to his awareness that allowing a 737 to 
pass 1,000 feet directly over a Cessna could expose the smaller aircraft to severe wake 
turbulence effects. In previous HITL simulations, controllers have expressed concern that in 
today’s environment they routinely provide these types of interventions, many of which may 
prevent accidents, but are not accounted for in any quantifiable way. The related concern is that 
in a more automated, data-centric environment, they may not be vigilant enough to detect and 
resolve these types of conflicts. 
5.2.5 Vertical Profile 
There are a number of possibilities with regard to vertical trajectories within an MBT 
concept. In the legacy system, altitudes are assigned and climb or descent clearance must be 
coordinated with ATC before changing altitudes. When climbing and descending aircraft are 
flying profiles that conflict in two dimensions, as is often the case in the vicinity of busy airports, 
controllers use altitude as a deconfliction tool by capping the maximum altitude a departing 
aircraft is cleared to climb to while establishing a minimum altitude an arrival may descend to 
until the aircraft are de-conflicted horizontally. However, even when aircraft are not necessarily 
in conflict, instances occur when a controller is only able to clear an aircraft to the top of the 
sector he controls, forcing a departing aircraft to temporarily level off before reaching its cruise 
altitude while awaiting handoff to a higher sector. An MBT concept may attempt to manage 
vertical trajectories to minimize the number of stair-step climbs on departure. No literature has 
been found discussing the safety case for such a concept, but in general, expectations for an 
MBT design that proposes changing the current methods of managing vertical movements of 
aircraft will need to include separation assurance as an integral part of the design. 
Another related concept involves allowing aircraft to execute continuous climbs during the 
en route phase as a more optimum flight profile. The current system includes provisions for this 
technique by employing block altitudes, but these blocks are impractical due to the layered 
nature of the current flight level architecture. It is possible that the legacy flight level system 
could be changed to provide lateral separation over a block of altitudes by increasing the 
number of lateral route alternatives, giving aircraft the freedom to maneuver vertically without an 
explicit clearance needed to change altitudes. The safety case for such a design would be 
established through collision risk modeling and would largely depend on the navigation and 
time-based performance of the aircraft. 
6. Summary of key findings 
This section summarizes the key findings of the study, with a particular focus on the 
implications for MBT. The section is arranged according to the topics in Sections 3, 4, and 5. 
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6.1 CPDLC/Data Comm 
During the CPDLC program, FAA had identified airborne reroutes as a benefit mechanism, 
but did not have the modeling tools to assess the benefit. Instead, the benefit assessment 
focused on the reduced voice frequency congestion benefit mechanism and associated 
increase in en route sector capacity. However, en route sector capacity is not a major bottleneck 
in the NAS and it is also not a tangible benefit to users. Had the FAA included the reroutes 
benefit mechanism, the users may have seen a tangible benefit - particularly benefits to support 
equipping.  
 
6.1.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Voice communication of complex reroutes is impractical for widespread use in the NAS. The 
nine-year deferment of data link capabilities has slowed MBT concept element progress. History 
may repeat itself if the MBT cost/benefits assessment makes the same mistake as the original 
CPDLC cost/benefits assessment. To mitigate these concerns, MBT should: 
 Identify benefit mechanisms that are tangible to users. 
 Identify methods for determining hard-to-assess benefit mechanisms. 
 Consider providing financial incentives for flight operators to equip with capabilities that 
are foundational to the MBT concept if the benefits are not clear cut for flight operators 
(as was done with the 2012 Data Comm program and with the European Link 2000+ 
Programme). 
6.2 Baseline 2 ADS-C EPP 
ADS-C EPP appears to be the only capability on the horizon with any momentum that can 
be utilized for sharing complete (or near-complete) FMS trajectory intent with ANSP ground 
systems. However, there is no mandate for ADS-C EPP. Aircraft that are equipped with FANS 
1/A, which supports basic ADS-C, will need to upgrade to what is referred to as Baseline 2 for 
an EPP capability, which Boeing says “is going to be prohibitively expensive.” The FAA has not 
committed to widespread ground deployment, and without that, Boeing does not believe there is 
a business case for B2 (Nguyen 2016). 
 
6.2.1 Specific implications for MBT 
The MBT ConOps should include a concept variant that assumes ADS-C EPP intent will not 
be available for high percentage of aircraft. For aircraft without EPP, managing aircraft trajectory 
prediction uncertainty will be more difficult, lessening the effectiveness of MBT. 
6.3 ADS-B In 
While ADS-B Out is mandated, ADS-B In is not so what will entice users to equip? The 
NextGen Equipage Paradox refers to the following: 
Despite the potential for significant benefits from NextGen, airlines and other operators 
are not making the needed aircraft equipage investments. There are still uncertainties in 
NextGen requirements and benefits. This means that in the end, those operators who 
69 
are last to equip with NextGen avionics will reap the most financial benefit, while those 
operators who are first will get the lowest returns at a far greater risk. 31 
6.3.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Any MBT concept elements that require self-spacing, self-merging, and/or self-separating 
will not be feasible for aircraft without ADS-B In.  
6.4 Advanced FMS capabilities 
For older aircraft with older avionics, FMS upgrades are not possible because of the 
inherent differences with newer technology. Looking to the future, Boeing says Baseline 2B “is 
going to be prohibitively expensive.” Air carriers have had bad experiences in the past where 
their investment in avionics upgrade have not been utilized and thus not provided any benefit 
because the corresponding investments on the ANSP side did not materialize. The FAA has not 
committed to widespread ground deployment, and without that, Boeing does not believe there is 
a business case for Baseline 2 (Nguyen 2016).  
6.4.1 Specific implications for MBT 
The wide range of FMS capabilities in the NAS that currently exists and will continue to exist 
for decades into the future results in a mixed capability environment. The MBT concept will have 
to consider the best approach for addressing the mixed capability environment on a concept 
element by concept element basis. In other words, what does best equipped, best served mean 
for each MBT concept element? 
6.5 SWIM 
SWIM has vast potential for improving information sharing across stakeholders that has 
been impossible until recently. However, the US definition of SWIM differs significantly from 
European SWIM, which has consequences for its implementation and use. 
6.5.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Existing concept elements should be reexamined to determine if newly available information 
can be leveraged to improve the concept element. However, dual standards for SWIM may limit 
international air carrier effectiveness with respect to certain MBT concept elements such as 
trajectory negotiations because of incomplete information. 
6.6 IFC 
High cost inhibits low-cost carriers from implementing IFC. 
6.6.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Low-cost carriers may not be able to leverage EFB applications and SWIM information. 
Thus, certain benefits of MBT (e.g., effective trajectory negotiation) that rely on dynamic 
information will not be attainable to them. 
6.7 AAtS 
Slow adoption of the AAtS approach may result in many interim sub-optimal, often 
competing stove piped solutions that impede the rate of AAtS implementation and take up. 
                                                 
31 http://www.rtca.org/Files/NAC%20Recommendations/NAC%20EquipAdHoc%20FinalApprvd.pdf  
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6.7.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Certain benefits of MBT such as effective trajectory negotiation may not be fully realized if 
adoption rate of AAtS is slow. 
6.8 Pilot/FMS information needs  
There are many ATC LOAs and SOPs that can change the FMS trajectory that are unknown 
to the pilot and are not available in an FMS database. Furthermore, trajectory changes due to 
these procedures often put the aircraft on an open trajectory. However, FMSs have limited 
database capacity to add the data associated with these SOPs and LOAs. 
6.8.1 Specific implications for MBT 
LOAs and SOPs place constraints on aircraft trajectories that today are not published. MBT 
should account for these constraints and their effect on trajectories and trajectory negotiation.  
6.9 The FOC’s role in NextGen 
In the JPDO’s FOC report (JPDO 2012), the following shortcomings were identified 
regarding the FOC’s limited role in NextGen. 
Finding 4: The rules and content for data sharing are not clearly defined. While NextGen 
stresses the importance of “distributed decision making,” increased user focus, and 
provisioning information to users, the current NGIP does not address the data 
availability, rules, and related processes that will be required to bring this to fruition. 
Finding 5: There is a lack of appreciation for and incorporation of the role of the FOC to 
ensure the success of the FAA Data Communications (Data Comm) program. 
6.9.1 Specific implications for MBT 
MBT needs to consider not only the functions ascribed to the FOC, but also specify the data 
to be exchanged or rules for data exchange.  
6.10 Closed trajectories 
Trajectory uncertainty causes controllers to use tactical clearances, which tend to be open 
trajectory clearances. Consider that automated conflict resolution advisories have been 
discussed for over two decades and still have not been implemented in ERAM.32 Without the 
automation support for closed trajectories, controllers will continue to use open trajectory 
techniques. 
6.10.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Open trajectory clearances exacerbate the trajectory uncertainty in the system. On the other 
hand, trajectory predictability enables controllers to use strategic, closed trajectory clearances, 
which then maintains a high level of trajectory predictability. Thus, the MBT concept needs to 
consider the set of technologies, procedures, and cultural changes that will be the tipping point 
that moves the NAS towards wide-spread use of closed trajectories and predictability to 
facilitate MBT. There is clearly cultural resistance to automated conflict resolution advisories. 
                                                 
32 https://www.caasd.org/library/papers/uret/ 
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6.11 Trajectory negotiation 
FMS capabilities do not support proposing a new trajectory, only to propose a flight-optimal 
way to achieve the given flight plan. EFB applications to support trajectory negotiation do not 
currently exist. While these applications will likely get developed when sufficient enablers are in 
place, the air carrier industry lack of interest in applications to leverage CTOP (which provide 
similar types of benefits as trajectory negotiation) is a cautionary tale for trajectory negotiation 
participation. 
6.11.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Trajectory negotiation is one of the MBT benefits that allows users to see direct, tangible 
benefits across the fleet or for individual flights. If users choose not to upgrade their capabilities 
to facilitate trajectory negotiation, it is indicator that they would not likely upgrade for other 
aspects of MBT. It will be difficult to make realistic estimates of user participation for trajectory 
negotiation, which will have a direct bearing on benefits. 
6.12 Management of residual trajectory uncertainty 
Residual uncertainty is not a primary reason why TBO adoption has been slow. Modern 
TBO concepts recognize the existence of residual uncertainty and include concept elements to 
accommodate it. These concept elements, while adding some complexity beyond the original 
“perfect world” concept that trajectories would be planned once and then followed precisely with 
no disturbances, are no more difficult to develop than other aspects of TBO concepts. 
Understanding how much residual uncertainty will exist, how to minimize it, and how to trade off 
between accommodating uncertainty and expending additional effort to reduce it, may have 
occupied some research effort that could have otherwise gone toward adopting TBO concepts 
operationally. In this way, residual uncertainty has contributed to “concept paralysis” in which 
not knowing which TBO concept should be pursued has prevented quicker adoption of TBO. For 
example, questions such as what types of trajectory synchronization should be included in the 
concept and are multiple trajectory predictions permitted or must there be only one trajectory 
prediction has allowed academics to write numerous papers without a consensus that 
encourages moving forward with concept validation. 
The lack of a single concept of operation for TBO has led to many different opinions about 
what TBO should be with little convergence by the ATM research community. The FAA needs to 
clearly define the TBO concept and the NAS Enterprise Architecture evolution associated with 
the transition to TBO. This provides an opportunity for NASA to provide leadership to help the 
FAA define the TBO concept elements, of which MBT is one. 
6.12.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Weather will continue to be a major contributor to residual trajectory uncertainty as well as 
TFM uncertainty. Yet it is well known in the ATM community that many DSTs do not perform 
well in dynamic situations such as weather (Gong and Mcnally 2015). This is not a coincidence 
– rather it is because they have not been designed to handle dynamic situations. Weather 
problems are often “assumed away” in the concept description or just completely ignored. The 
underlying justification, whether stated or not, is that most days in the NAS do not have major 
weather disruptions. Furthermore, the complexity of addressing the dynamic weather situations 
during concept evaluations limits their assessment. Thus, while lateral and temporal trajectory 
constraints are seen as the interface between TFM and MBT, the validity of these constraints in 
addressing demand/capacity imbalances in the presence of weather will likely be degraded. If 
these constraints create inefficiencies, MBT can provide flexibility and agility when the 
constraints are updated to mitigate to some extent the initial inefficiencies. 
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6.13 UPR/UPT 
 Controller complexity and traffic density in the eastern US will continue to prevent the 
use of UPRs in that region. 
 No research has been performed to identify the traffic level threshold where UPR 
requests should be accepted or rejected. 
 FMS database capacity limitations impact UPR flight planning capabilities and potential 
airborne rerouting. 
 Human factors issues associated with the NRS grid can tip the scale towards denying 
UPRs. 
 Misunderstanding between stakeholders about whether UPTs include constraints can 
delay progress. 
 Many SOPs/LOAs contain trajectory constraints that are unknown to the navigation 
databases used by the FMS and FOC flight planning applications, which can result in 
flight plans getting amended to support ANSP needs. 
6.13.1 Specific implications for MBT 
Trajectory negotiation is one of the MBT benefits that allows users to see direct, tangible 
benefits across the fleet or for individual flights. If these roadblocks cannot be addressed, then it 
will limit user participation and the loss of a key benefit. 
6.14 Growing consensus for aspects of MBT concept elements 
There is growing consensus that the introduction of SWIM, AAtS, IFC, and EFBs has 
significant potential to disrupt business as usual in the ATM environment, particularly for MBT 
concepts such as trajectory negotiation, which provides a tangible benefit to the user. And the 
FAA is making important strides to enable more effective airborne reroutes. These are all 
predicated on Data Comm equipage. There is also the realization that a mixed equipage 
environment will exist on many fronts for the foreseeable future for Data Comm, ADS-B In, and 
ADS-C EPP. Each concept element will have to be evaluated to determine how best-equipped, 
best-served should be applied with an emphasis on identifying tangible benefit mechanisms. 
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Acronyms 
Acronym Definition 
AAtS Aircraft Access to SWIM 
ABRR Airborne Reroute 
ACS Aeronautical Common Services 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Contract 
ADS-R Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast 
AFP Airspace Flow Program 
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
AID Aircraft Interface Device 
A-IM Advanced Interval Management 
AIM Aeronautical Information Management 
AIMM AIM Modernization 
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider 
AOP Autonomous Operations Planner 
ARSI Arrival Route Status and Impact 
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center 
ASDI Aircraft Situation Display to Industry 
ASPIRE Asia Pacific Initiative to Reduce Emissions 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATCSCC Air Traffic Control System Command Center 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
ATMRPP Air Traffic Management Requirement and Performance 
Panel 
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network 
ATOP Advanced Technologies & Oceanic Procedures 
ATSU Air Traffic Service Unit 
CAR Coded Airborne Reroute 
CD&R Conflict Detection & Resolution 
CDM Collaborative Decision Making 
CDR Coded Departure Route 
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CIWS Corridor Integrated Weather System 
CPDLC Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications 
ConOps Concept of Operations 
CSP Communications Service Provider 
CSS-Wx Common Support Services-Weather 
CTOP Collaborative Trajectory Options Program 
DAG-TM Distributed Air/Ground Traffic Management 
DARP Dynamic Airborne Reroute Procedure 
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Acronym Definition 
Data Comm Data Communications 
DCL Departure Clearance 
DMS Data Management Service 
DSP Departure Spacing Program 
DST Decision Support Tool 
EDA Efficient Descent Advisor 
EDCT Expect Departure Clearance Time 
EET Estimated Elapsed Time 
EFB Electronic Flight Bag 
EPP Extended Projected Profile 
ERAM En Route Automation Modernization 
ERASMUS En Route traffic Soft Management Ultimate System 
ES Extended Squitter 
ET Expiration Time 
EWD Enhanced WINS Dissemination 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FANS Future Air Navigation System 
FCA Flow Constrained Area 
FEA Flow Evaluation Area 
FIR Flight Information Region 
FIS-B Flight Information Services-Broadcast 
FMS Flight Management System 
FNS Federal NOTAM System 
FOC Flight Operations Center 
FSM Flight Schedule Monitor 
GDP Ground Delay Program 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GS Ground Stop 
HAR High Altitude Routing 
HITL Human In The Loop 
HMI Human Machine Interaction 
IAP Instrument Approach Procedure 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IFC In-Flight Connectivity 
IFR Instrument Flight Rule 
IPI Intermediate Projected Intent 
ITWS Integrated Terminal Weather System 
JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office 
LOA Letter of Agreement 
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Acronym Definition 
MAP Monitor Alert Parameter 
MBT Management by Trajectory 
MCP Mode Control Panel 
MIT Miles in Trail 
NAS National Airspace System 
NAVAID Navigational Aid 
NCR NAS Common Reference 
NEMS NAS Enterprise Messaging Service 
NEXRAD Next Generation Weather Radar 
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System 
NGIP NextGen Implementation Plan 
NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOTAM Notices to Airmen 
NRP North American Route Program 
NRR Non-Restrictive Routing 
NRS Navigation Reference System 
NTML National Traffic Management Log 
NTN NextGen Trajectory Negotiation 
OPD Optimized Profile Descent 
OSS One Stop Shop 
PBN Performance Based Navigation 
PDMP Pre-Defined Meter Point 
PIREP Pilot Report 
RAPT Route Availability Planning Tool 
RCP Required Communications Performance 
RCTP Required Communications Technical Performance 
RNAV Area Navigation 
RNP Required Navigation Performance 
RTA Required Time of Arrival 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RTP Required Time Performance 
RVR Runway Visual Range 
SA Situation Awareness 
SAA Special Activity Airspace 
SFDPS SWIM Flight Data Publication Service 
SID Standard Instrument Departure 
SIGMET Significant Meteorological Information 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route 
STARS Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 
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Acronym Definition 
STDDS SWIM Terminal Data Distribution System 
SWIM System Wide Information Management 
TAP Traffic Aware Planner 
TASAR Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Request 
TBFM Time Based Flow Management 
TBO Trajectory Based Operations 
TCP Trajectory Change Point  
TFDM Terminal Flight Data Manager 
TFM Traffic Flow Management 
TFMData Traffic Flow Management Data 
TFMS Traffic Flow Management System 
TFR Temporary Flight Restriction 
TIS-B Traffic Information Services-Broadcast 
TLS Target Level of Safety 
TMC Traffic Management Coordinator 
TMI Traffic Management Initiative 
TMU Traffic Management Unit 
TO Surveillance Overdue Delivery Time 
TOAC Time-of-Arrival Control 
TOC Top of Climb 
TOD Top of Descent 
TRACON Terminal Radar Control 
TRN Transaction 
TRNET Transaction Expiration Time  
TSD Traffic Situation Display 
UAT Universal Access Transceiver 
UPR User Preferred Route 
UPS United Parcel Service 
UPT User Preferred Trajectory 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
VDL VHF Data Link 
VHF Very High Frequency 
WAM Wide Area Multilateration 
WARP Weather and Radar Processor 
WINS Weather Information Network Server 
WMSCR Weather Message Switching Center Replacement System 
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